Artificial Intelligence and Patent Ownership by Schuster, W. Michael
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 75 | Issue 4 Article 5
2-19-2019
Artificial Intelligence and Patent Ownership
W. Michael Schuster
Oklahoma State University, mike.schuster@okstate.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons, Law and Economics Commons, and the Science
and Technology Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation





Artificial Intelligence and Patent 
Ownership 
W. Michael Schuster* 
Abstract 
Invention by artificial intelligence (AI) is the future of 
innovation. Unfortunately, as discovered through Freedom of 
Information Act requests, the U.S. patent regime has yet to 
determine how it will address patents for inventions created solely 
by AI (AI patents). This Article fills that void by presenting the first 
comprehensive analysis on the allocation of patent rights arising 
from invention by AI. To this end, this Article employs Coase 
Theorem and its corollaries to determine who should be allowed to 
secure these patents to maximize economic efficiency. The study 
concludes that letting firms using AI to create new technologies (as 
opposed to software companies, programmers, or downstream 
parties) to obtain the resulting patents is the optimal policy. 
Table of Contents 
 I. Introduction .................................................................... 1946 
 II. Background .................................................................... 1952 
  A. Artificial Intelligence Technology ........................... 1953 
  B. The Legal Threshold for Inventorship .................... 1959 
  C. Literature Review of Artificial Intelligence 
   and Intellectual Property Law ................................ 1963 
 III. Coase Theorem ............................................................... 1967 
  A. Application of Coase Theorem ................................. 1969 
  B. Using Coase Theorem to Construct Policy ............. 1978 
 IV. Coasean Analysis of Patent Ownership ........................ 1981 
                                                                                                     
 * Oklahoma State University, Mike.Schuster@okstate.edu. 
1946 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1945 (2018) 
 
  A. Types of Patent Value .............................................. 1982 
  B. Patent Valuation as a Function of Market 
   Participation ............................................................ 1985 
  C. Assignment of Patent Rights .................................. 1988 
  D. Considerations on Not Allocating Patent Rights 
   to Software Companies ............................................ 1992 
   1. Internalization of Invention by Software 
    Firms .................................................................. 1992 
   2. Patent Troll Activity .......................................... 1995 
   3. Costs Associated with Software Company 
    Patentees ............................................................ 1999 
  E. Future Research ...................................................... 2001 
 V. Conclusion ...................................................................... 2003 
I. Introduction 
The inventor’s tale is traditionally the story of a lone genius 
relentlessly toiling in a garage or attic until achieving a 
groundbreaking innovation.1 Although research on iterative 
invention has largely discredited this narrative, it remains a 
mainstay in the American psyche.2 But while the public struggles 
to accept the reality that important discoveries occur via small 
                                                                                                     
 1. See Robert L. Park, Science in the Courts, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 575, 585 
(2002) (“We have this myth of the lone genius laboring all by himself in his little 
workshop in the attic.”); Keith Sawyer, The Collaborative Nature of Innovation, 
30 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 293, 312 (2009) (arguing that collaboration has replaced 
creativity as the responsibility of “the lone genius, the solitary inventor working 
long hours to finish ahead of the competition”). 
 2. See Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 
709, 710–11 (2012) (explaining how the “lone genius inventor” is a myth by 
illustrating the true factual accounts of Thomas Edison’s, Bell’s, and the Wright 
Brothers’ inventions); Erin Shinneman, Note, Owning Global Knowledge: The 
Rise of Open Innovation and the Future of Patent Law, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 935, 
935 (2010) (“[T]he narrative of the lone inventor has faded over the years as 
technological advances, especially the internet, have resulted in dramatic 
changes to the innovative landscape.”). 
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steps,3 an even greater break from the accepted narrative is 
forthcoming—invention by non-human parties.4 
Artificial intelligence (AI) permeates much of modern 
business5 and is increasingly a powerful tool of innovation.6 
Inventing computers are routinely used to create new 
technologies,7 such as BMW’s recent design of self-driving 
automobiles.8 Some analysts believe it is only a short time until AI 
is responsible for the majority of invention.9 This raises the issue 
of how the patent system should treat technologies created solely 
                                                                                                     
 3. See Sawyer, supra note 1, at 313 (explaining how consumers rarely see 
how “each innovation builds incrementally on a long history of prior 
innovations”). 
 4. See Liana B. Baker, Tech Moguls Declare Era of Artificial Intelligence, 
REUTERS (June 2, 2016, 9:06 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tech-ai-
conference/tech-moguls-declare-era-of-artifical-intelligence-iduskcn0yp035 (last 
visited Dec. 4, 2018) (discussing Elon Musk’s warning that “artificial intelligence 
and machine learning will create computers so sophisticated and godlike that 
human will need to implant ‘neural laces’ in their brains to keep up”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 5. See id. (explaining how artificial intelligence is used in “web search 
systems, marketing recommendation functions and security and financial trading 
programs” and predicting it will spread to healthcare, education, and financial 
services). 
 6. See Rory Cellan-Jones, Stephen Hawking Warns Artificial Intelligence 
Could End Mankind, BBC (Dec. 2, 2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-
30290540 (last visited Dec. 4, 2018) (explaining Stephen Hawking’s concerns 
about machine learning advancements that will surpass human intelligence and 
potentially eliminate the human race) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 7. See Baker, supra note 4 (explaining how artificial intelligence technology 
will allow for the innovation of driverless cars and service robots). 
 8. See Bernard Marr, How BMW Uses Artificial Intelligence and Big Data 
to Design and Build Cars of Tomorrow, FORBES (Aug. 1, 2017, 12:28 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2017/08/01/how-bmw-uses-artificial-
intelligence-and-big-data-to-design-and-build-cars-of-tomorrow/#450c6f2a2b91 
(last visited Dec. 4, 2018) (discussing how BMW used artificial intelligence to 
create self-driving virtual chauffeur software) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 9. See Ryan Abbott, I Think, Therefore I Invent: Creative Computers and 
the Future of Patent Law, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1079, 1080 (2016) (“Soon computers will 
be routinely inventing, and it may only be a matter of time until computers are 
responsible for most innovation.”). 
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by computers with insufficient human engagement to recognize a 
human inventor (AI inventions).10  
Patents have been granted on technologies designed 
exclusively by software,11 but in these situations, AI’s part in the 
innovation was not disclosed to the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (the “USPTO” or “Patent Office”).12 These 
patentees chose not to mention the computer’s invention13 due to 
uncertainty about the law.14 The question of whether, and to 
whom, patents can be granted for AI inventions has yet to be 
addressed by the legislature or courts,15 though several countries 
plan to do so in the near future.16  
Regarding domestic policy, the USPTO has no internal 
guidelines on AI inventions.17 The Author filed a Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) request seeking all promulgations or 
                                                                                                     
 10. See Charlotte Walker-Osborn & Christopher Chan, Artificial Intelligence 
and the Law, ITNOW, March 2017, at 36–37 (“[T]he law envisages an individual 
as the inventor who contributes to conception of an invention and, yet, there is no 
concept of a computer being able to conceive of a patentable invention.”). 
 11. See Abbott, supra note 9, at 1084–87 (describing the granted patents of 
two AI-created computational inventions); see also Ben Hattenbach & Joshua 
Glucoft, Patents in an Era of Infinite Monkeys and Artificial Intelligence, 19 STAN. 
TECH. L. REV. 32, 44 (2015) (“Of a sampling of issued patents that were conceived 
wholly or in part by computers, none have ever been subject to litigation.” (citing 
U.S. Patent Nos. 4,908,773; 6,847,851; 7,521,463; 7,915,245; 8,053,477; 8,338,464; 
8,445,537; 8,450,368; 8,476,273)). 
 12. See Abbott, supra note 9, at 1085–88 (explaining two AI-created 
inventions for which the Patent Office granted patents without knowing about 
the non-human inventors’ role).  
 13. See, e.g., id. at 1088 (providing the example of one patentee whose legal 
counsel advised him not to disclose AI’s involvement and considered him and his 
team the sole inventors despite the fact that AI created the entire invention). 
 14. See Hattenbach & Glucoft, supra note 11, at 44 (stating that courts have 
not ruled definitively on “whether computer-conceived inventions are patentable” 
and discussing the lack of litigation on the issue). 
 15. See id. (“The courts do not appear to have explicitly ruled on whether 
computer-conceived inventions are patentable.”); see also Abbott, supra note 9, at 
1099 (“The Patent Act does not directly address the issue of a computer 
inventor . . . and there appears to be no case law on the issue of whether a 
computer could be an inventor.”). 
 16. See Walker-Osborn & Chan, supra note 10, at 36–37. 
 17. See Abbott, supra note 9, at 1099 (“The Patent Office has never issued 
guidance addressing the subject [of computer inventors], and there appears to be 
no case law on the issue of whether a computer could be an inventor.”). 
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directives “to patent examiners instructing them on how to 
examine patent applications listing one or more inventor that is 
not a human (including software, computers, artificial intelligence, 
etc.).”18 In response, the USPTO stated that it had no relevant 
information,19 indicating a lack of internal direction on the issue.  
This Article provides needed guidance on the efficient 
allocation of patent rights, should the USPTO decide to grant AI 
patents. The extant literature has, at best, given passing 
discussion regarding who should be allowed to secure these 
rights.20 To address this void in the literature, the Article employs 
one of the primary tools in law and economics: Coase Theorem.21 
This proposition holds that aggregate wealth is maximized 
through inter-firm transactions where property entitlements are 
clearly allocated and transaction costs are zero.22 The second 
                                                                                                     
 18. Email from Mike Schuster, Assistant Professor, Okla. State Univ., to 
USPTO FOIA Officer, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (Feb. 13, 2017, 09:33 
AM) (on file with author) (stating the full request). In full, the request asked for 
“[a]ny internal instructions (formal or informal) or promulgations communicated 
to patent examiners instructing them on how to examine patent applications 
listing one or more inventor that is not a human (including software, computers, 
artificial intelligence, etc.).” Id. 
 19. See Letter from Louis J. Boston, Jr., USPTO FOIA Officer, Office of Gen. 
Law, to Mike Schuster, Assistant Professor, Okla. State Univ. (Mar. 9, 2017) 
(regarding FOIA Request No. F-17-00124) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 20. See, e.g., Abbott, supra note 9, at 1082 (arguing that computers and 
nonhuman authors should qualify as legal inventors, but not analyzing efficient 
allocation). 
 21. Infra Parts III–IV; see also James W. Bowers, The Elementary Economics 
of Bijuralism: A First Cut, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 68, 68 n.2 (2002) (“The Coase 
Theorem, the fundamental analytical tool of law and economics, holds that if 
there were no transaction costs, law would, in economic theory, become 
irrelevant.” (citing R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 
(1960))). 
 22. See Jeanne L. Schroeder, The End of the Market: A Psychoanalysis of 
Law and Economics, 112 HARV. L. REV. 483, 527 (1998) (“If one assumes 
rationality, no transaction costs, and no legal impediments to bargaining, all 
mis-allocations of resources would be fully cured in the market by bargains.” 
(citing Guido Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability 
Rules—A Comment, 11 J.L. & ECON. 67, 68 (1968))); see also Jeff Sovern, The 
Coase Theorem and the Power to Increase Transaction Costs, 40 MCGEORGE L. 
REV. 935, 935 n.1 (2009) (“[I]n a regime of zero transaction costs, . . . negotiations 
between the parties would lead to those arrangements being made which would 
maximize wealth . . . irrespective of the initial assignment of rights.” (citing R.H. 
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assumption does not exist in reality,23 but a corollary to the 
Theorem is that minimization of transaction costs can effect a real 
world situation mimicking the efficient situation predicted by 
Coase.24 Based on this corollary, the Article proposes that 
efficiency is best attained by allocating AI property rights to 
parties that purchase or license AI software and utilize it for 
invention (herein called “AI users”).25 These parties hold these 
patents in highest value, and thus, aggregate welfare is maximized 
by allocating the rights to them.26 
The first substantive Part of this study introduces AI and its 
capacity to engage in invention, with particular emphasis on 
genetic algorithms—a type of software that mimics biological 
evolution to reach optimal design parameters.27 Part II continues 
by discussing the legal threshold for inventorship and showing 
why humans operating inventing software are not inventors. This 
                                                                                                     
Coase, The Institutional Structure of Production, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 713, 717 
(1992))). 
 23. See Jeremy Kidd, Kindergarten Coase, 17 GREEN BAG 2D 141, 145 (2014), 
http://www.greenbag.org/v17n2/v17n2_articles_kidd.pdf (providing that the 
Coase Theorem describes a world without transaction costs “where bargaining is 
perfectly cheap and easy, where there are no physical, technological, emotional, 
or other obstacles to bargaining”); see also Alan Schwartz, The Default Rule 
Paradigm and the Limits of Contract Law, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 389, 398 
(1993) (“Transaction costs obviously exceed zero . . . .”). 
 24. See Barak Y. Orbach & Frances R. Sjoberg, Excessive Speech, Civility 
Norms, and the Clucking Theorem, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1, 8 (2011) (applying the 
Coase Theorem to the adoption of legal rules and concluding that in order to 
minimize transaction and social costs, states should avoid creating regulations 
when possible). 
 25. Infra Parts III–IV. 
 26. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Coase Theorem and Arthur Cecil Pigou, 51 
ARIZ. L. REV. 633, 638 (2009) (“[I]n cases of high costs of movement, a 
legislature . . . could assign the initial allocation to the highest value user so that 
movement would not have to occur.” (emphasis added)); see also WERNER Z. 
HIRSCH, LAW AND ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS 18 (2d. ed. 1988) (“As 
transaction costs are reduced, more transactions result and can be carried out 
with enhanced efficiency; social welfare is thus increased.”). 
 27. See Woodrow Barfield, Intellectual Property Rights in Virtual 
Environments: Considering the Rights of Owners, Programmers and Virtual 
Avatars, 39 AKRON L. REV. 649, 660 (2006) (explaining that generic algorithms 
are used to create “intelligent acting” avatars in virtual reality and giving the 
example of search procedures using natural selection principles to solve 
problems). 
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Part concludes by discussing the interplay between AI and 
intellectual property laws and then reviewing the extant literature 
on how computer creations should be treated under patent law and 
the related field of copyright. 
Part III introduces Coase Theorem and its pioneering 
determination that, assuming no transaction costs, self-interested 
parties will reach economic efficiency28 (i.e., allocative efficiency)29 
through inter-firm trading if property entitlements are clearly 
allocated30 and transactions are costless.31 It is irrelevant to whom 
the entitlements are initially assigned, as the party who most 
values the property interest will trade to obtain them.32 This 
Article applies Coase’s teachings to find that, within the scope of 
                                                                                                     
 28. See Bowers, supra note 21, at 61 n.2. 
 29. This Article specifically refers to allocational or Pareto efficiency when 
referencing “economic efficiency.” See infra Part III and note 130; see also Stephen 
E. Ellis & Grant M. Hayden, The Cult of Efficiency in Corporate Law, 5 VA. L. & 
BUS. REV. 239, 241 (2010) (“When economists discuss efficiency, they are typically 
referring to Pareto optimality, also known as Pareto efficiency or allocative 
efficiency.”). 
 30. See Troy A. Rule, Airspace in an Age of Drones, 95 B.U. L. REV. 155, 195 
(2015) (“The Coase Theorem suggests that laws that clearly assign initial 
entitlements relating to a resource promote allocative efficiency.” (citing R.H. 
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 21 (1960))). 
 31. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 
(1960)(“[I]f such market transactions are costless, such a rearrangement of rights 
will always take place if it would lead to an increase in the value of production.”); 
see also HIRSCH, supra note 26, at 18 (“As transaction costs are reduced, more 
transactions result and can be carried out with enhanced efficiency; social welfare 
is thus increased.”); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 10 (8th ed. 
2011) (explaining a simplified version of the Coase Theorem as concluding “if 
transactions are costless, the initial assignment of a property right will not affect 
the ultimate use of the property”); Oxford Org., Ltd. v. Peterson (In re Stotler & 
Co.), 144 B.R. 385, 393 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (applying Coase Theorem to bankruptcy 
and advocating for the free flow of information to protect investors); Coltman v. 
Comm’r, 980 F.2d 1134, 1137 (7th Cir. 1992) (applying Coase Theorem to 
conclude: “So long as the rule of law is known when parties act, the ultimate 
economic result is the same no matter which way the law has resolved issue”); 
Schwartz, supra note 23 at 397–98 (stating that Coase Theorem requires several 
assumptions, namely “(a) the parties whom the allocation affects are informed 
about relevant economic variables; (b) wealth effects are absent; (c) competitive 
markets exist; and (d) the cost of making transactions is zero”). 
 32. See Stewart J. Schwab, Collective Bargaining and the Coase Theorem, 72 
CORNELL L. REV. 245, 265 (1987) (explaining that Coase Theorem predicts that 
regardless of entitlement assignments, parties will negotiate and trade to reach 
an efficient bargain). 
1952 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1945 (2018) 
 
Coase’s assumptions, an efficient state of affairs will be reached 
with regard to AI patent ownership so long as these rights are 
clearly defined regardless of the initial assignment of those rights.33  
Part IV deviates from the assumption of no transaction costs 
and identifies real-world policies that effect the economic efficiency 
predicted by Coase. A primary strategy towards this goal is to 
assign property entitlements to those who most value the right.34 
In that situation, the inter-firm transactions underlying Coase 
Theorem become unnecessary because the party who most benefits 
from the right (and thus, would always trade to obtain it in the 
absence of transaction costs) has it initially allocated to them.35 
With this in mind, the Part evaluates a host of parties involved in 
the AI invention timeline (e.g., software companies, programmers, 
AI users, product engineers, etc.) to determine which one most 
values AI patents. As determined through the analysis contained 
herein, AI users (firms that purchase AI software and utilize it for 
invention) will most value AI patents and, thus, should be entitled 
to obtain these patents to maximize economic efficiency.36 
II. Background 
For purposes of patent law, an “inventor” is the party “who 
conceived [an] invention,”37 and he has the right to obtain a patent 
on the technology.38 Simply coming up with an amorphous idea is 
                                                                                                     
 33. Infra Part III. 
 34. See Daniel B. Kelly, Toward Economic Analysis of the Uniform Probate 
Code, 45 U. MICH. J.L. Reform 855, 865 (2012) (“Because transaction costs may 
prevent parties from bargaining to achieve the optimal outcome, Coase suggests 
that courts should attempt to award an entitlement to the party that values it the 
most.” (citing Hovenkamp, supra note 26, at 638)). 
 35. See Hovenkamp, supra note 26, at 638 (“[I]n cases of high costs of 
movement, a legislature . . . could assign the initial allocation to the highest value 
user so that movement would not have to occur.” (emphasis added)). 
 36. Infra Part IV. 
 37. See C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., 157 F.3d 1340, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“The 
‘inventor’ in patent law, is the person or persons who conceived the patented 
invention.” (citing Collar Co. v. Van Dusen, 90 U.S. 530, 563–64 (1874); 
Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1227–28 (Fed. Cir. 
1994))). 
 38. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (declaring that Congress has the power 
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insufficient;39 to qualify as an inventor, one must identify the 
“definite and permanent idea of the invention as it will be used in 
practice.”40 But what happens where AI independently creates a 
patentable invention, and humans are merely non-inventing 
onlookers?41 
This Article explores the question of who should own patent 
rights arising from computer invention with insufficient human 
contribution to warrant identification of a human inventor.42 The 
study does not address situations where AI and a human are 
co-inventors, such that the human can obtain a patent under 
current precedent. With this in mind, the current Part reviews the 
state of AI technology and applicable law.  
A. Artificial Intelligence Technology 
                                                                                                     
“to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts by securing for limited Times 
to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries”). 
 39. See Oasis Research, LLC v. Carbonite, Inc., No. 4:10-CV-00435, 2015 WL 
123642, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2015), motion to certify appeal denied, No. 
4:10-CV-435, 2015 WL 12829617 (E.D. Tex. June 11, 2015) (explaining the need 
for a definite idea rather than a mere general one). 
 40. Burroughs, 40 F.3d at 1229 (Fed. Cir. 1994); see also Garrett Corp. v. 
United States, 422 F.2d 874, 881 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (“One who merely suggests an idea 
of a result to be accomplished, rather than means of accomplishing it, is not a 
joint inventor.” (citing Forgie v. Oil-Well Supply Co., 58 F. 871 (3d Cir. 1893))); 
Worden v. Fisher, 11 F. 505 (E.D. Mich. 1882))). 
 41. See, e.g., Dom Galeon & Sarah Marquart, Expert: When an AI Invents 
Something, It Should Be Credited as the Inventor, FUTURISM (Nov. 8, 2016), 
https://futurism.com/expert-when-an-ai-invents-something-it-should-be-
credited-as-the-inventor/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2018) (noting that nonhuman 
inventors created the Oral-B CrossAction toothbrush, several music 
compositions, and some food recipes) (on file with the Washing and Lee Law 
Review). 
 42. See generally Hattenbach & Glucoft, supra note 11 (addressing a similar 
question of who should be credited with patent ownership of computer-generated 
technologies and how publication of such material might prevent others from 
obtaining patents on other inventions); see also Kalin Hristov, Artificial 
Intelligence and the Copyright Dilemma, 57 IDEA 431, 435 (2017) (discussing 
“works generated by AI programs with the direct guidance, assistance or input of 
human beings”). 
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AI encompasses any technology undertaking an activity that, 
if done by a human, would require intelligence.43 In the current 
“Era of Artificial Intelligence,”44 smart computers are creating 
original cuisine,45 designing the next generation of luxury 
automobiles,46 tracking hate crimes,47 and composing music.48 Of 
interest to this Article, of course, is the use of AI to invent new 
things.49 
There are many manners by which computers autonomously 
engage in activities that require “intelligence.”50 For example, 
                                                                                                     
 43. See DANIEL CREVIER, AI: THE TUMULTUOUS HISTORY OF THE SEARCH FOR 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 9 (1993); Marvin L. Minsky, Artificial Intelligence, SCI. 
AM., Sept. 1966, at 247. 
 44. See Baker, supra note 4 (stating that Tech CEOs dubbed the present as 
the “Era of Artificial Intelligence”). 
 45. See Hattenbach & Glucoft, supra note 11, at 34 (providing that IBM’s 
Watson supercomputer created and predicted the appeal of “quadrillions of 
different ingredient combinations” (citing Leah Hunter, How Creative Can 
Computers Be?, FAST COMPANY (Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.fastcompany.com/302 
7293/how-creative-can-computers-be (last visited Dec. 4, 2018) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review))). 
 46. See Marr, supra note 8 (discussing the use of artificial intelligence to 
create self-driving virtual chauffeur software). 
 47. See David Z. Morris, Google’s New Site Uses Artificial Intelligence to 
Track Hate Crimes, FORTUNE (Aug. 19, 2017), 
http://fortune.com/2017/08/19/google-propublica-artificial-intelligence-hate-
crimes/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2018) (explaining a tool that uses machine learning to 
understand the intent behind hate crimes documented in news reports) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 48. See Katherine Bourzac, A Neuromorphic Chip that Makes Music, IEEE 
SPECTRUM (May 23, 2017 1:00 PM), http://spectrum.ieee.org/tech-
talk/robotics/artificial-intelligence/a-neuromorphic-chip-that-makes-music (last 
visited Dec. 4, 2018) (explaining a neuromorphic chip that uses brain-inspired 
circuits to compose melodies) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 49. See, e.g., RAY KURZWEIL, HOW TO CREATE A MIND: THE SECRET OF HUMAN 
THOUGHT REVEALED 124 (2012) (discussing attempts to digitally replicate brain 
functioning of a roundworm and, eventually, of a human); see also John Mannes, 
Autodesk Generative Design Takes in Constraints and Makes Its Own 3D Models, 
TECHCRUNCH.COM (June 26, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/06/26/ 
generative-design/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2018) (“The software takes in engineering 
constraints and generates a bunch of potential designs that can either be 
immediately put to use or used as a jumping-off point for new creations.”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 50. See, e.g., Erica Fraser, Computers as Inventors: Legal and Policy 
Implications of Artificial Intelligence on Patent Law, 13 SCRIPT-ED 305, 315–19 
(2016) (explaining how artificial intelligence employs genetic programming, 
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neural networks are engineered to mimic human brain activity to 
“learn” relevant information.51 Fuzzy logic employs 
decision-making algorithms that—rather than making 
assessments premised solely on binary answers to relevant 
questions—base their output on information that may be partially 
true or vague, as is common in the real world.52 While each of these 
may be employed to create new technology,53 the below gives a 
more thorough analysis to a single example of inventing software.54  
Genetic algorithms independently develop new inventions by 
mimicking biological evolution55 via “an iterative process of 
                                                                                                     
artificial neural networks, and robot scientists to invent new technologies). 
 51. See Dana S. Rao, Neural Networks: Here, There, and Everywhere—An 
Examination of Available Intellectual Property Protection for Neural Networks in 
Europe and the United States, 30 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 509, 509 (1997) 
(explaining how neural networks learn and generalize information to solve 
problems that exceed the scope of their initial training); see also Serge Jorgensen, 
Convergence of Forensics, E-Discovery, Security, & Law, 12 AVE MARIA L. REV. 
291, 291 n.3 (2014) (providing that neural networks attempt to imitate the way 
the brain works by “creating connections between processing elements” (citing 
Neural Network, WEBOPEDIA, https://www.webopedia.com/TERM/N/neural_ 
network.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 52. See Joseph S. Bird, Cognitive Neuroscience as a Model for Neural 
Software Patent Examination, 31 AIPLA Q.J. 273, 297 (2003) (explaining that 
fuzzy logic is “multi-valued logic with intermediate values to be defined between 
conventional binary evaluations like zero/one or yes/no” and thus can represent 
ambiguous knowledge); see also Bart Kosko & Satoru Isaka, Fuzzy Logic, SCI. 
AM., July 1993, at 76 (“Fuzzy logic manipulates such vague concepts as warm or 
still dirty and so helps engineers to build air conditioners, washing machines and 
other devices . . . .” (internal quotations omitted)). 
 53. See Fraser, supra note 50, at 315–19 (explaining how artificial 
intelligence employs genetic programming, artificial neural networks, and robot 
scientists to invent new technologies, such as NASA’s satellite antennas, 
electronic toothbrushes, and drug-resistant malaria research identification). 
 54. Unless specifically identified, the use of the terms “artificial intelligence” 
and “AI” should be understood herein to reference any type thereof. 
 55. See Abbott, supra note 9, at 1086 (explaining how genetic programming 
emulates the “simple processes” of “mutation, sexual recombination, and natural 
selection” to generate patentable results and achieve machine intelligence); see 
also KURZWEIL, supra note 49, at 147 (explaining the use of genetic algorithms to 
set “God parameters” by coding potential solutions, defining a list of parameters 
and randomly generating thousands of genetic codes); John R. 
Koza, Human-Competitive Results Produced by Genetic Programming, 
in 11 GENETIC PROGRAMMING AND EVOLVABLE MACHINES 251, 265 (2010) 
(providing thirty-one instances in which genetic programming produced a human 
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simulated competition and improvement.”56 This type of AI 
functions to optimize a set of design parameters, with each 
parameter being analogized to a single gene within a larger 
chromosome.57 The computer initially creates a fixed number of 
chromosomes with random values for their constituent genes—
forming several sets of parameters with random attributes.58 The 
resultant chromosomes are run through a cost function59 to 
determine the best performing sets of parameters, and poorly 
performing chromosomes are discarded.60 The process further 
                                                                                                     
competitive result that duplicated the functionality of a previously patented 
invention); John R. Koza et al., Evolving Inventions, SCI. AM., Feb. 2003, at 52 
(discussing how computer programmers use software versions of evolutionary 
processes to achieve machine intelligence). Genetic algorithms were initially 
developed in the mid-1970s by Professor John Holland. See Donald T. Hornstein, 
Complexity Theory, Adaptation, and Administrative Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 913, 936–
37 (2005) (describing genetic algorithms as a “paradigm for harnessing the power 
of adaption”). 
 56. KURZWEIL, supra note 49, at 148. 
 57. See RANDY L. HAUPT & SUE ELLEN HAUPT, PRACTICAL GENETIC 
ALGORITHMS 19, 30 (2d ed. 2004) (providing and applying background on cellular 
heredity to cost functions of genetic algorithms); see also KURZWEIL, supra note 
49, at 148 (discussing the process of enabling solutions to emerge by rejecting the 
iterative cycles with no generation improvements and using the best designs in 
the last generation). 
 58. See HAUPT & HAUPT, supra note 57, at 36, 52 (explaining how the gene 
can represent a binary setting or some parameter within an array of potential 
entries because the genetic algorithm assigns random numbers to a group of 
chromosomes, or population, which it later converts to floating-point numbers); 
KURZWEIL, supra note 49, at 147 (“First, we determine a way to code possible 
solutions . . . . [T]hen we define a list of all of the parameters . . . . Then we 
randomly generate thousands or more genetic codes.”). “The population size 
affects both the ultimate performance and the efficiency of GA’s. GA’s generally 
do poorly with very small populations, because the population provides an 
insufficient sample size for most hyperplanes. A large population is more likely 
to contain representatives from a large number of [potential solutions].” J.J. 
Grefenstette, Optimization of Control Parameters for Genetic Algorithms, in BILL 
P. BUCKLES & FREDERICK E. PETRY, GENETIC ALGORITHMS 7 (1992) (internal 
citation omitted). “On the other hand, a large population requires more 
evaluations per generation, possibly resulting in an unacceptably slow rate of 
convergence.” Id.  
 59. See Preston C. Green, III et. al., Race-Conscious Funding Strategies and 
School Finance Litigation, 16 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 39, 49 (2006) (“Cost function 
analysis is a statistical method which determines the costs associated with 
attaining a particular set of outcomes . . . .”). 
 60. See KURZWEIL, supra note 49, at 148 (describing how researchers “run 
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mimics natural selection by allowing the best performing 
candidates to survive and “mate” (i.e., trading values for some 
subset of their attributes with another set of parameters to 
produce “children”).61 This methodology ensures a variety of 
attribute combinations is tested62 and is repeated until the entire 
population (the number of initial chromosomes) has been filled 
with the remaining parents and their children.63 
The AI lastly ensures that a large variety of genetic pairings 
are explored by randomly altering (“mutating”) some subset of 
parameters.64 Mutation rates are selected to be high enough to 
ensure some variability, but sufficiently low to guarantee 
continuation of preferred attributes.65 The process then begins 
again with the remaining population of chromosomes subjected to 
the cost function to determine which sets of parameters perform 
                                                                                                     
each program generated by the parameters and judge it on appropriate criteria 
(did it complete the task, how long did it take, and so on)”); HAUPT & HAUPT, supra 
note 57, at 36, 54 (explaining that only the strongest chromosomes survive). This 
determination can be made so the best-performing X% of the population is 
retained, chromosomes satisfying some performance threshold are retained, or 
via some other methodology of retention. Id. at 36–38. “Deciding how many 
chromosomes to keep is somewhat arbitrary. Letting only a few chromosomes 
survive to the next generation limits the available genes in the offspring. Keeping 
too many chromosomes allows bad performers chance to contribute their traits to 
the next generation.” Id. at 38. 
 61. See RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 33 (1976) (explaining how 
natural selection encourages species to mimic those with more advantageous 
genetic traits); HAUPT & HAUPT, supra note 57, at 38–41, 56 (demonstrating that 
the selection of chromosomes to be paired together can be done in a variety of 
manners, including random pairing and weighting the likelihood of procreation 
based on the level of performance). 
 62. See Grefenstette, supra note 58, at 6 (explaining that the “power of GA’s 
derives largely from their ability to exploit efficiently [a] vast amount of 
accumulating knowledge by means of relatively simple selection mechanisms”). 
 63. See KURZWEIL, supra note 49, at 148 (explaining that the researchers 
“cause each of the survivors to multiply themselves until they reach the same 
number” as the initial population). 
 64. See HAUPT & HAUPT, supra note 57, at 43 (describing how mutations 
occur in the genetic algorithm and the benefits of altering the chromosomes); 
Grefenstette, supra note 58, at 7 (“Mutation is a secondary search operator which 
increases the variability of the population. After selection, each bit position of 
each structure in the new population undergoes a random change with the 
probability equal to the mutation rate M.”). 
 65. See Grefenstette, supra note 58, at 7 (explaining how mutation levels 
that are too high or too low negatively affect an experiment). 
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best.66 Iterations continue for a specified number of repetitions or 
until an acceptable level of performance is achieved.67  
This type of inventing software has proven effective.68 General 
Electric utilized genetic algorithms to design jet engines that 
outperform existing units.69 Hitachi used the technology to create 
a quieter bullet train nose case with better aerodynamics.70 
Likewise, genetic algorithms have created novel communications 
systems, diesel engines, pharmaceuticals, and power plant 
turbines.71 
Beyond the above discussion about what AI is, it is notable to 
define what it is not. Alongside the expanding scope of rights for 
non-human corporations,72 some have discussed personhood for AI 
                                                                                                     
 66. See HAUPT & HAUPT, supra note 57, at 44 (“After the mutations take 
place, the costs associated with the offspring and mutated chromosomes are 
calculated . . . . The process described is iterated.”). 
 67. See id. at 47, 52, 62 (describing the point at which the researcher should 
stop the genetic algorithm). 
 68. See Ray Kurzweil, The Virtual Thomas Edison, TIME (Dec. 3, 2018), 
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,90538-1,00.html (last 
visited Dec. 4, 2018) (“The results of [using genetic algorithms] can be 
surprisingly effective, often solving difficult engineering and other design 
problems.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 69. See id. (“General Electric also uses genetic algorithms, in the design of 
jet engines . . . .”). 
 70. See ROBERT PLOTKIN, THE GENIE IN THE MACHINE: HOW 
COMPUTER-AUTOMATED INVENTING IS REVOLUTIONIZING LAW AND BUSINESS 60 
(2009) (explaining how genetic algorithms optimized the design and performance 
of the bullet train). 
 71. See Peter M. Kohlhepp, When the Invention is an Inventor: Revitalizing 
Patentable Subject Matter to Exclude Unpredictable Processes, 93 MINN. L. REV. 
779, 786–87 (2008) (“Virginia engineers designed a novel and effective satellite 
communications antenna.” (citing Anne Eisenberg, When a Gizmo Can Invent a 
Gizmo, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1999, at G9)); PLOTKIN, supra note 70, at 60 
(explaining that a genetic algorithm “produced such a significant improvement in 
the efficiency of the drug discovery process that it has become the most-used 
software by 1,500 computational chemists at Pfizer” (citing Interview by Robert 
Plotkin with David Fogel (Sept. 20, 2007))); Liza Vertinsky & Todd M. Rice, 
Thinking About Thinking Machines: Implications of Machine Inventors for Patent 
Law, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 574, 581 (2002) (discussing how genetic algorithms 
increased the efficiency of turbines by five percent). 
 72. See Ronit Donyets-Kedar, Challenging Corporate Personhood Theory: 
Reclaiming the Public, 11 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 61, 61–62 (2017) (“Two recent 
landmark decisions by the American Supreme Court, Citizens United and Hobby 
Lobby, have expanded constitutional protections for corporations to include First 
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in fields such as real property ownership,73 maritime regulations,74 
and constitutional law.75 The current discussion assumes that AI 
is not an entity that will be granted personhood rights under 
patent law, and it will not be able to own AI patents.76 Should that 
happen, the instant question—pertaining to who should own AI 
patents—becomes moot. 
B. The Legal Threshold for Inventorship 
This subpart analyzes precedent regarding what constitutes 
invention for patenting purposes and uses it to show why humans 
using AI to create new technologies do not satisfy this threshold. A 
primary requirement for inventorship is “mak[ing] a significant 
contribution to the invention.”77 To meet this standard, one must 
bring about a “definite and permanent idea of the invention 
                                                                                                     
Amendment rights and the right to religious liberty.”); Anna Gentry, Corporate 
Personhood and Nonprofit Director Duty of Obedience: Legal Implications That 
Necessitate Expanded Standing to Sue, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 165, 186 (2015) 
(“[B]eginning in the 1960s, corporations saw a massive expansion of legal rights 
and protections.”). 
 73. See David Marc Rothenberg, Can Siri 10.0 Buy Your Home? The Legal 
and Policy Based Implications of Artificial Intelligent Robots Owning Real 
Property, 11 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 439, 447 (2016) (“Because of the moral 
principles tied to real property ownership, this right must be carefully scrutinized 
before it is extended to autonomous artificial intelligent entities . . . .”).  
 74. See Michal Chwedczuk, Analysis of the Legal Status of Unmanned 
Commercial Vessels in U.S. Admiralty and Maritime Law, 47 J. MAR. L. & COM. 
123, 164 (2016) (discussing the liability implications of using artificial intelligence 
on ships).  
 75. See Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences, 70 
N.C. L. REV. 1231, 1255 (1992) (addressing the question of whether the 
Constitution should extend to artificial intelligence).  
 76. But see Fraser, supra note 50, at 330 (discussing the possibility of 
“recognising computers as legal persons” with regard to inventing activity); Jason 
Tashea, Estonia Considering New Legal Status for Artificial Intelligence, ABA 
(Oct. 20, 2017, 1:10 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/estonia_ 
considering_new_legal_status_for_ai/?utm_campaign==tech_monthlyabajournal
.com/news/article/e (last visited Dec. 4, 2018) (“Estonia is considering a legal 
status for artificial intelligence beyond property.”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 77. Netscape Commc’ns Corp. v. ValueClick, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 2d 699, 721 
(E.D. Va. 2010), on reconsideration in part, 704 F. Supp. 2d 544 (E.D. Va. 2010) 
(citing Pannu v. Iolab Corp., 155 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
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[sufficient to allow] a skilled artisan [to] carry out the invention 
without undue experimentation.”78 This requirement is not 
satisfied by merely providing information describing the state of 
the art.79 On this point, the Federal Circuit’s Nartron Corp. v. 
Schukra U.S.A., Inc.80 is instructive.81  
Nartron turned on whether Mr. Joseph Benson was an 
inventor of a massaging car seat.82 Benson alleged inventorship 
because he suggested the use of an “extender for a lumbar support 
adjustor” in the patented invention.83 No one contested that he 
recommended use of this element, but neither did anyone dispute 
that this component was common in prior inventions.84 The court 
resolved the issue by recognizing that Benson’s suggestion only 
mimicked the existing state of technology, and thus, showed no 
ability beyond that of one of ordinary skill in the art.85 Because 
simply providing information about the current state of the art is 
not an invention, Benson was held not to be an inventor.86 
                                                                                                     
 78. Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1229–30 (Fed. 
Cir. 1994). The logic of this holding is exemplified in the Supreme Court’s 1847 
Wood v. Underhill, 46 U.S. 1 (1847), opinion—dealing with patent 
enablement— which held that where a patent “gives only the names of the 
substances which are to be mixed together, without stating any relative 
proportion, undoubtedly it would be the duty of the court to declare the patent to 
be void.” Id. at 6. 
 79. See Nartron Corp. v. Schukra U.S.A. Inc., 558 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 
2009) (“One who simply . . . explains the state of the art without ever having a 
firm and definite idea of the claimed combination as a whole does not qualify as 
a joint inventor.” (quoting Ethicon Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1460 
(Fed. Cir. 1998))). 
 80. 558 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 81. See id. (describing the requirements for inventorship). 
 82. See id. at 1353 (finding that Benson was not an inventor because he 
“provided only an insignificant contribution to the invention”). 
 83. Id. at 1357. 
 84. See id. at 1355 (“[Benson] admits that the idea of an extender for a 
lumbar support adjustor in an automobile seat was in the prior art.”).  
 85. See id. at 1358 (“Benson’s contribution of the extender amounted to 
‘nothing more than explaining to the inventors what the then state of the art was 
and supplying a product to them for use in their invention.’” (quoting Hess v. 
Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 106 F.3d 976, 981 (Fed. Cir. 1997))). 
 86. See id. (reversing the district court to hold that Benson was not a 
co-inventor). 
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In addition, “[o]ne who merely suggests an idea of a result to 
be accomplished, rather than means of accomplishing it, is not [an] 
inventor.”87 This rule is embodied by the Eastern District of 
Texas’s Oasis Research, LLC v. Carbonite, Inc.,88 wherein 
Carbonite argued that Mr. Jack Byrd should have been included 
as an inventor on a data-handling patent.89 Carbonite proffered 
that Byrd “conceived the idea for a remote online backup service” 
in the early 1990s.90 Lacking skills needed to create the technology, 
he passed the project to other employees and had nothing further 
to do with it.91 The court reasoned that—due to his failure to 
participate in the actual creation of the invention beyond 
identifying a goal—Byrd was not an inventor.92  
A related line of cases hold that employing another party to 
invent does not make one an inventor.93 This proposition, for 
example, set forth in TS Holdings, Inc. v. Schwab94 from the 
Eastern District of Michigan is instructive. Therein, Mr. Barry 
Schwab was hired to create a “video product to be used in 
automobile marketing.”95 Schwab obtained a patent on the 
subsequent invention, and his employer later alleged that he 
                                                                                                     
 87. Garrett Corp. v. United States, 422 F.2d 874, 881 (Ct. Cl. 1970). Garret 
Corp. has been cited by the Federal Circuit for this proposition. See Nartron Corp., 
558 F.3d at 1359 (adopting the rule stated in Garrett Corp.); Eli Lilly & Co. v. 
Aradigm Corp., 376 F.3d 1352, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (adopting the rule stated in 
Garrett Corp. as well); see also Drone Techs., Inc. v. Parrot S.A., 838 F.3d 1283, 
1306 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (applying the Garrett Corp. rule); Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 
684 F. Supp. 2d at 721 (explaining that the Garrett Corp. rule is well-established). 
 88. No. 4:10-CV-00435, 2015 WL 123642 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2015). 
 89. See id. at *6 (listing Byrd’s contributions to the patents in question). 
 90. Id. at *3. 
 91. See id. at *6–7 (detailing Byrd’s role in creating the invention). 
 92. See id. at *7 (“[T]he contributions made by Byrd merely suggest an idea 
of a result to be accomplished . . . rather than a means of accomplishing it.”). 
 93. See Nartron Corp. v. Schukra U.S.A. Inc., 558 F.3d 1352, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 
2009) (explaining that an “entrepreneur’s request to another to create a product 
that will fulfill a certain function” does not make the entrepreneur an inventor 
(quoting Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 937 F. Supp. 1015, 1035 (D. Conn. 
1996))); TS Holdings, Inc. v. Schwab, No. 09-CV-13632, 2011 WL 13205959, at *4 
(E.D. Mich. Dec. 16, 2011) (categorizing one who hires another to complete the 
invention as the owner, not the inventor). 
 94. No. 09-CV-13632, 2011 WL 13205959 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 16, 2011). 
 95. Id. at *1. 
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should be included as an inventor.96 The court disagreed, rebuffing 
arguments that Schwab’s employer was an inventor because he 
“financed the reduction to practice” and was the initial reason 
Schwab began work on the invention.97 Because providing 
monetary support and instructing others to create new technology 
are not sufficient to constitute invention, Schwab’s employer was 
not an inventor.98 
This precedent establishes that a human using inventing AI is 
not an inventor for purposes of patent law.99 To initiate AI 
invention, a person may input seed information,100 including 
existing technologies, e.g., for neural networks,101 or relevant 
parameters to be optimized, e.g., for genetic algorithms.102 Such 
acts merely provide the AI with access to existing knowledge in the 
field, which Nartron held is not invention.103  
After uploading this information, a human may identify a 
technology to invent or technological field within which to 
invent.104 For instance, one piece of inventing software—the 
Invention Machine—requires a user to input “specifications for a 
desired result,” which the AI will seek to satisfy.105 Genetic 
                                                                                                     
 96. See id. at *2 (“[The employer] filed suit against Schwab, claiming that he 
is a co-inventor . . . .”).  
 97. Id. at *4 (citing Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 
1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). 
 98. See id. (“[T]here is no legal basis for [the] assertion that financing such 
reduction to practice equates to invention itself.”). 
 99. See Hattenbach & Glucoft, supra note 11, at 46 (“[I]t seems highly 
unlikely that courts would bestow inventorship status on a computer.”). 
 100. See Abbott, supra note 9, at 1094 (“Computers require some amount of 
human input to generate creative output.”). 
 101. See Fraser, supra note 50, at 317–18 (explaining how Artificial Neural 
Networks, a form of AI, mimic brain activity to accelerate technological 
development). 
 102. See HAUPT & HAUPT, supra note 57, at 36, 52; Watson Cooks Up 
Computational Creativity, IBM, https://perma.cc/GGV7-NHT4 (last visited Dec. 
4, 2018) (listing the parameters that developers placed on a computer program to 
create recipes) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 103. See Nartron Corp., 558 F.3d at 1358 (explaining that one who merely 
describes the state of the art is not an inventor). 
 104. See Abbott, supra note 9, at 1094 (describing the role humans play in 
computer-generated inventions).  
 105. Id. at 1087 (citing Telephone Interview with John Koza, President, 
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algorithms may also be set to meet a particular set of performance 
parameters.106 Inputting these parameters is not invention. As 
made clear in Oasis Research, identification of a goal or technology 
to be created by others (be it AI or another human) is insufficient 
to constitute invention.107 
Lastly, the fact that a human finances, owns, or operates AI is 
insufficient to qualify that person as an inventor.108 As made clear 
in TS Holdings, financing or initiating the process of invention 
(e.g., by setting inventors to task) does not satisfy the standard to 
be named on a patent.109 In such situations, a person may be 
responsible for an invention, but they have not actually invented a 
new technology.110 This subpart establishes that humans may not 
an inventor where AI is involved. The following subpart evaluates 
how this issue has been addressed in the literature. 
C. Literature Review of Artificial Intelligence and Intellectual 
Property Law 
The interplay of intellectual property law and computer 
creations (both inventions and works of authorship) has been the 
subject of some scholarship.111 This subpart reviews the literature 
                                                                                                     
Genetic Programming Inc. (Jan. 22, 2016)). 
 106. See HAUPT & HAUPT, supra note 57, at 47, 52, 62 (discussing how genetic 
algorithms can be run until a particular goal, set by the user, is satisfied). 
 107. See Oasis Research, LLC v. Carbonite, Inc., No. 4:10-CV-00435, 2015 WL 
123642, at *7 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2015) (declining to extend inventorship to one 
who “merely suggest[ed] an idea of a result to be accomplished . . . rather than a 
means of accomplishing it”); see also Eli Lilly & Co. v. Aradigm Corp., 376 F.3d 
1352, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“One who merely suggests an idea of a result to be 
accomplished, rather than a means of accomplishing it, is not a joint inventor.” 
(quoting Garrett Corp. v. United States, 422 F.2d 874, 881 (Ct. Cl. 1970))). 
 108. See TS Holdings, Inc. v. Schwab, No. 09-CV-13632, 2011 WL 13205959, 
at *4 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 16, 2011) (“[T]here is no legal basis for [the] assertion that 
financing such reduction to practice equates to invention itself.”). 
 109. See id. (declining to classify someone who hires another to develop the 
invention as an inventor). 
 110. See id. at *6 (“Ownership of a patent application guaranties neither 
inventorship nor ownership of subsequent continuations-in-part . . . .”). 
 111. See generally Ralph D. Clifford, Intellectual Property in the Era of the 
Creative Computer Program: Will the True Creator Please Stand Up?, 71 TUL. L. 
REV. 1675 (1997) (arguing that computer generated inventions cannot qualify for 
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pertaining to whether AI patents can be constitutionally granted, 
application of patent laws to AI inventions, and copyright’s 
interplay with computer-generated works—a relevant subject 
because patents and copyrights issue pursuant to a common 
enumerated power (the Intellectual Property (IP) Clause).112 
Early legal commentary discussed whether AI patents and 
copyrights could be issued pursuant to the IP Clause, which allows 
Congress to grant these rights to “authors and inventors.”113 
Clifford argues that copyright and patent statutes both implicitly 
require that “a human must creatively toil to produce the 
[authorship or invention,]” and this limitation should be read into 
the IP Clause.114 In contrast, Miller asserts that there are no 
caselaw, statutory, or policy limitations inhibiting the extension of 
authorship (and by implication, inventorship) to computers.115 On 
the issue, the Supreme Court stated that—with regard to the IP 
Clause—terms such as authors and inventors “have not been 
construed in their narrow literal sense but, rather, with the reach 
necessary to reflect the broad scope of constitutional 
principles.”116 This Article proceeds assuming such precedent 
renders AI patents constitutional.117 
                                                                                                     
copyright protection); Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection for Computer 
Programs, Databases, and Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything New Since 
CONTU?, 106 HARV. L. REV. 977 (1993) (arguing that copyright law would protect 
computer generated inventions). 
 112. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (establishing intellectual property rights). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Clifford, supra note 111, at 1701 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
 115. See Miller, supra note 111, at 1067 n.445 (arguing that computers could 
be considered copyright authors). 
 116. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973). 
 117. The IP Clause has previously been used as a source of legislative 
authority to grant copyrights to other non-human entities, e.g., corporations. See 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Since the early 1900s, copyright law has provided 
that an employer is the author of a “work made for hire.” See Easter Seal Soc’y 
for Crippled Children and Adults of La., Inc. v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323, 325 
(5th Cir. 1987) (explaining the progression of the interpretation of the “work for 
hire” doctrine and providing the current statutory definition under 17 U.S.C. § 1); 
Catherine L. Fisk, Authors at Work: The Origins of the Work-for-Hire Doctrine, 15 
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 5 (2003) (“The creation of the modern [work for hire] 
doctrine preceded its first appearance in the federal Copyright Act of 
1909 . . . . The concept began to appear after 1860, though no case actually 
applied such a rule until a pair of cases did so in 1899 and 1900.”). In these 
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Initial scholarship likewise addressed AI invention’s impact 
on the scope of patentable subject matter.118 Plotkin analyzed how 
the “ubiquity of artificial invention technology” influences the 
non-obviousness requirement,119 concluding that AI expands the 
scope of obvious discoveries and therefore narrows the breadth of 
patentable inventions.120 Recognizing the same issue, Ravid and 
                                                                                                     
instances, a business is deemed the author of works prepared by employees in the 
scope of their employment. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012) (providing that the buyer 
is the author if the work is made for hire); id. § 101 (defining “work made for 
hire”). This interpretation of “author” deviates from the traditional 
understanding that an author is the party that actually reduces an expression to 
a tangible form and expands the definition to include non-human parties, e.g., 
corporations. See SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
AUT-AWY (10th ed. 1792); WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 72 (3d ed. 1917) 
(providing a definition of “author” as being an originator—which could potentially 
include an employer— but also providing another definition stating that an author 
is the first to write something).  
 118. See PLOTKIN, supra note 70, at 111 (exploring the idea of AI inventions 
and whether AI inventions may be patentable).   
 119. Id.; see also Brenda M. Simon, The Implications of Technological 
Advancement for Obviousness, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 331, 333 
(2013) (“As access to searchable information and computing capabilities expand, 
it might appear that very few inventions are nonobvious enough to merit patent 
protection.”); Brenda M. Simon, Rules, Standards, and the Reality of Obviousness, 
65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 25, 33 (2014) (“Advances in technology have muddled the 
definition of the PHOSITA and the scope of the prior art—two central factors in 
the determination of obviousness.”). 
 120. See PLOTKIN, supra note 70, at 102 (“Supply every engineer with 
state-of-the-art artificial invention technology and train them in how to use that 
technology, and you have effectively boosted the level of ordinary inventive skill 
in the field . . . .”); id. at 112 (“What this means is that the patent examiner will 
need to ask whether an inventor of ordinary skill, using artificial invention 
technology, would have found the invention at issue obvious.”). On the contrary, 
Plotkin recognized that if patent examiners do not acknowledge that those of 
ordinary skill in the art utilize invention technologies, inventors can employ these 
technologies to create vast numbers of patentable inventions that are obvious 
using advanced technologies but would not have been obvious without the 
technology (and thus are patentable under the “old standard”). See id. at 107 
(explaining that if patents inventors do not take into account the effect of publicly 
available “artificial invention technology” on the inventor of ordinary skill, then 
there may be a “patent flood” for patents on obvious inventions); see also William 
Samore, Artificial Intelligence and the Patent System: Can a New Tool Render a 
Once Patentable Idea Obvious?, 29 SYRACUSE J. SCI. & TECH. L. 113, 142 (2013) 
(arguing the widespread use of genetic programming will “change invention and 
creative thinking” and make previously non-obvious inventions obvious and 
non-patentable); Saurabh Vishnubhakat, The Antitrusting of Patentability, 48 
SETON HALL L. REV. 71, 95 (2017) (discussing the identification of what constitutes 
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Liu argue that—rather than revising the law on 
obviousness— Congress should avoid the topic and simply not 
grant AI patents.121 Hattenbach and Glucoft disagreed, asserting 
that patents could arise from computer-generated patent claims 
describing new technologies.122 
 Abbott has likewise addressed the issue of whether AI can be 
an “inventor” and if its inventions should be patentable.123 Viewing 
the issue through the Constitution’s mandate that patent law 
incentivizes inventive activity, Abbott concluded AI patents 
encourage the creation of inventing machines (and the resultant 
inventions).124 Abbott’s paper briefly discussed ownership of these 
patents, finding that a software’s owner/licensor should receive 
any patent rights.125 
 In a directly analogous field, scholars have addressed whether 
AI creations are copyrightable, and if so, who ought to own the 
rights.126 Samuelson concluded that a computer’s user should own 
any copyright arising therefrom, as that party was most 
responsible for satisfying the requirements for copyright.127 In 
contrast, Wu argued that where a work is not attributable to a 
computer user or software programmer, “the court should assign 
                                                                                                     
a person having ordinary skill). 
 121. See Shlomit Yanisky Ravid & Xiaoqiong (Jackie) Liu, When Artificial 
Intelligence Systems Produce Inventions: The 3A Era and an Alternative Model 
for Patent Law, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 2215, 2215 (2018) (arguing the current patent 
system is “outdated, inapplicable, and irrelevant with respect to inventions 
created by AI systems”).  
 122. See Hattenbach & Glucoft, supra note 11, at 50 (arguing that if a 
computer-generated claim meets all the requirements for a patentable invention, 
then those types of inventions should be patentable); see also Technology, CLOEM, 
https://www.cloem.com/flat/technology/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2018) (explaining 
“Cloem technology combines human [patent] drafting and machine drafting”) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 123. See Abbott, supra note 9, at 1081 (examining whether a computer can be 
an inventor and whether “computational inventions” are patentable). 
 124. See id. at 1104 (arguing that making AI patentable will encourage people 
to invent); Fraser, supra note 53, at 325–28 (reaching a similar conclusion). 
 125. See id. at 1082 (explaining that if the “computer’s owner, developer, and 
user are different entities, such parties could negotiate” contract arrangements). 
 126. See generally Pamela Samuelson, Allocating Ownership Rights in 
Computer-Generated Works, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1185 (1986).  
 127. See id. at 1203 (using the work for hire doctrine as support for a 
computer’s user to own any copyrightable material arising from that computer). 
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the copyright to whoever owns the copyright to the computer 
program.”128 Building from this background, the following Part 
begins the analysis of how to allocate AI patent rights to best 
promote efficiency. 
III. Coase Theorem 
Economic theory mandates that a competitive marketplace 
should seek economic efficiency—a situation wherein no party can 
be made better without harming another.129 This target—known 
as Pareto or allocative efficiency,130 but referenced herein simply 
as “economic efficiency”—is likewise a goal of patent law.131 The 
following Part discusses means by which this aim can be achieved 
when allocating patent rights arising from AI discoveries.132 The 
                                                                                                     
 128. Andrew J. Wu, From Video Games to Artificial Intelligence: Assigning 
Copyright Ownership to Works Generated by Increasingly Sophisticated Computer 
Programs, 25 AIPLA Q.J. 131, 138 (1997). 
 129. See Sean Leibowitz, Note, State Insurance Rate Regulation: A Coasian 
Perspective, 17 J.L. BUS. & ETHICS 107, 110 (2011) (providing background 
information on accepted economic theory on economic efficiency); PAUL A. 
SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 148 (18th ed., McGraw-Hill 
Irwin 2005). A Pareto optimal situation “maximizes the surplus from 
cooperation.” Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three 
Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 833 n.8 (2003); see Mark M. 
Bykowsky & William W. Sharkey, Using a Market to Obtain the Efficient 
Allocation of Signal Interference Rights 13–14 (F.C.C., Working Paper No. 4, 
2012), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-314439A1.pdf (examining 
how the pareto optimal situation could be achieved in the auction context); Wis. 
Elec. Power Co., 56 P.U.R.4th 509, n.40 (F.E.R.C. Sept. 19, 1983) (“Under optimal 
economic efficiency, goods and services have been allocated in such a way that no 
individual, for the time being at least, would choose to consume more or less of 
any good or service. This state of things is also known as allocative efficiency or 
Pareto optimality . . . .”). 
 130. See Willingham v. NovaStar Mortg., Inc., No. 04-CV-2391, 2006 WL 
6676801, at *19 (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 7, 2006) (explaining Pareto efficiency “occurs 
when no individual can be made better off without making another worse off”); 
Ellis & Hayden, supra note 29, at 241 (“When economists discuss efficiency, they 
are typically referring to Pareto optimality, also known as Pareto efficiency or 
allocative efficiency.”). 
 131. See Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual 
Property, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2655, 2661 (1994) (indicating that the “goal of 
intellectual property law is often described in allocational efficiency terms”). 
 132. Infra Part III. 
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inquiry proceeds by treating these patents as a positive externality 
and subjecting them to analysis under Coase Theorem and the host 
of assumptions related thereto.133 The discussion concludes in Part 
IV by making policy suggestions once these assumptions are 
relaxed.  
Externalities are side effects from one’s activities for which the 
actor does not bear all consequences for or benefits from.134 Such 
secondary effects represent a policy problem because they create 
“a divergence between private marginal cost and social marginal 
cost,”135 whereby producers make choices based on individual 
economic factors without considering societal costs or benefits. 
Restated, there are many instances where firms will—acting out 
of perceived self-interest—choose to produce at a non-efficient 
level.136 Coase Theorem, however, minimizes this concern.137 It 
holds that—where transaction costs are zero and in the presence 
of perfect information—resources will be distributed efficiently if 
relevant property entitlements are clearly allocated regardless of 
the initial allocation.138  
                                                                                                     
 133. Infra Part III. 
 134. See Wendy E. Wagner, What’s It All About, Cardozo?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 
1577, 1586 (2002) (providing an explanation of externalities in the economics 
context); Thomas A. Donovan, Litigation: An Antidote for Democracy, 54 FED. 
LAW. 8, 9 (2007) (providing that “externalities can be positive or negative” and are 
“the impacts that one person’s behavior has on others”); Jonathan R. Macey, 
Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure, and Enron, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 
394, 411–12 (2004) (discussing how externalities are “economic side effects” that 
come from actions of various parties that affect a third party who is not 
compensated or charged for the effects of the externality); Stefan J. Padfield, In 
Search of a Higher Standard: Rethinking Fiduciary Duties of Directors of 
Wholly-Owned Subsidiaries, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 79, 121 n.160 (2004) 
(providing another definition of externalities). 
 135. John W. Mill, Note, Agricultural Chemical Contamination of 
Groundwater: An Economic Analysis of Alternative Liability Rules, 1991 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 1135, 1154 (1991) (citing ROBERT D. COOTER & THOMAS S. ULEN, LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 45 (1988)). 
 136. Id.  
 137. See generally Coase, supra note 31.  
 138. See id. at 15 (explaining, given transaction costs are zero, that the initial 
determination of property rights does not matter because the party who values 
the right most will acquire it eventually); HIRSCH, supra note 26, at 19 (stating 
under the Coase Theorem’s assumptions, resource allocation will be at the 
Pareto-optimal level regardless of initial allocation); POSNER, supra note 31, at 10 
(explaining how the Coase Theorem, including its assumptions, provides that the 
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It does not matter whether an entitlement is given to a party 
that is in a strong position to financially exploit that right or not,139 
because interested parties can bargain between themselves, such 
that whomever most values the entitlement will pay to obtain it.140 
Any extrinsic costs or benefits will, via inter-firm transactions, find 
their way to the manufacturer, who then bases decisions on the 
total social benefit and produces products at an efficient level.141  
A. Application of Coase Theorem 
The below example depicts how—in the presence of no 
transaction costs and perfect information—firms reach an efficient 
state of affairs if relevant property entitlements are clearly 
allocated.142 Farmer grows wheat and makes a $1,500 daily profit 
from his operation until TrainCo installs a train track running just 
                                                                                                     
“initial assignment of a property right will not affect the ultimate use of the 
property”); Rule, supra note 30, at 195 (stating the Coase Theorem and applying 
it to airspace rights in the context of drones); In re Stotler & Co., 144 B.R. 385, 
393 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (“Coase’s theorem about contracting around the law’s 
assignment of risk depends on the free flow of information.”); Coltman v. Comm’r, 
980 F.2d 1134, 1136–37 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating Coase Theorem illustrates “so 
long as the rule of law is known when parties act, the ultimate economic result is 
the same no matter which way the law has resolved the issue”). Coase theorem 
requires several assumptions, namely “(a) the parties whom the allocation affects 
are informed about relevant economic variables; (b) wealth effects are absent; (c) 
competitive markets exist; and (d) the cost of making transactions is zero.” 
Schwartz, supra note 31, at 397–98; see Enrique Guerra-Pujol & Orlando I. 
Martínez-García, Does the Prisoner’s Dilemma Refute the Coase Theorem?, 47 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 1289, 1300 (2014) (outlining the assumptions of the Coase 
Theorem). 
 139. See Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Sprigman, Valuing 
Intellectual Property: An Experiment, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 6 (2010) (stating that 
the law presumes “parties will negotiate to transfer property rights” to those who 
“might best exploit them”). 
 140. See Leibowitz, supra note 129, at 111 (explaining the efficient use of 
resources under the Coase Theorem and its assumptions); Rule, supra note 30, at 
195 (explaining that per the Coase Theorem, laws clearly allocating “initial 
entitlements related to a resource promote allocative efficiency” by making it easy 
for those who most value the resource to bargain over it). 
 141. See Coase, supra note 31 (explaining that if transactions are costless, 
then the initial determination of rights can be changed if the changes “would lead 
to an increase” in the value of what is produced).  
 142. See generally id. 
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outside Farmer’s land.143 The trains emit sparks that ignite fires, 
with each fire causing $200 in damage to the farm per train per 
day.144 TrainCo’s profits are highest when running seven trains per 
day, with profits diminishing beyond that point.145 The gains for 
each party are shown below on a per daily train basis.146 
  
                                                                                                     
 143. See POSNER, supra note 31, at 10 (using a similar railroad and farmer 
example to illustrate Coase’s Theorem).  
 144. See id. (providing a similar example to illustrate Coase’s Theorem). 
 145. Infra Table 1.  
 146. Infra Table 1.  
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Table 1—Coase Theorem 









0 $0 $1500 $1500 
1 $225 $1300 $1525 
2 $450 $1100 $1550 
3 $675 $900 $1575 
4 $900 $700 $1600 
5 $1075 $500 $1575 
6 $1250 $300 $1550 
7 $1350 $100 $1450 
8 $1300 $0 $1300 
 
From an economic efficiency perspective, the optimal situation 
is where net surplus (the sum of all profits) is maximized 
(regardless of what party receives the surplus).147 A maximized net 
                                                                                                     
 147. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH 
ITSELF 90–91, 405 (1978) (explaining that “[c]onsumer welfare” is greatest when 
resources are efficiently allocated and antitrust law aims to “preserve, improve, 
and reinforce the powerful economic mechanisms that compel businesses to 
respond to customers”); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE 
LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 61–63 (2d ed. 1999) (explaining Chicago 
School antitrust policy and stating that economic efficiency “should be the 
exclusive goal of antitrust laws”); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN 
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 8 (1976) (arguing the economic theory that a monopoly 
often leads to economic inefficiency “provides the only suitable basis for antitrust 
policy”); Herbert Hovenkamp, Chicago and Its Alternatives, 1986 DUKE L.J. 1014, 
1018 (1986) (“The maximization of economic surplus, which is the sum of 
consumers’ surplus and producers’ surplus, is conventionally stated as the goal of 
Chicago School antitrust policy.”); Russell S. Jutlah, Economic Theory and the 
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surplus indicates that efficiency has been achieved.148 Thus, four 
trains per day (reaching the maximum surplus of $1,600) is 
optimal.149 The question thus becomes: how can government 
incentivize TrainCo to run four trains per day? 
In the absence of any regulation or law enforcement, both 
parties will engage in attempts to change the law via litigation or 
lobbying to their favor.150 TrainCo wants a law protecting it from 
liability for damages to the farm, and Farmer prefers a law holding 
TrainCo liable. In this situation, the parties will spend some 
amount $X on lobbying, and total surplus equals the net profits 
less $X. The expenditures on lobbying render it impossible to reach 
economic efficacy (where total surplus is $1,600).  
Coase Theorem predicts that this problem will be solved—and 
economic efficiency obtained—if relevant property entitlements 
(e.g., TrainCo’s ability to burn farm land liability free or Farmer’s 
ability to sue for damages) are clearly allocated regardless of the 
allocation.151 This surprising phenomenon is described below. 
                                                                                                     
Environment, 12 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 10 (2001) (“[I]t is well settled within welfare 
economics that a perfect competitive market maximizes social welfare, or achieves 
a Pareto optimum, through a socially efficient allocation of resources.” (citing S.K. 
NATH, A PERSPECTIVE OF WELFARE ECONOMICS 36 (1973))); see also Daniel A. 
Farber & Brett H. McDonnell, Why (and How) Fairness Matters at the 
IP/Antitrust Interface, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1817, 1818 (2003) (arguing that, beyond 
maximizing net surplus, “the law should also encourage a fair division of the 
economic surplus, at least as a secondary goal”). 
 148. See Kate Darling, Contracting About the Future: Copyright and New 
Media, 10 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 485, 506 n.161 (2012) (discussing that the 
pareto-optimal situation occurs when no one actor can be better off without 
making another worse off); Juan Antonio Gaviria, An Experiment on the Role of 
Penalty Clauses and the Level of Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract on the 
Prevention of the Hold-Up Problem in Colombian Contract Law, 14 RICH. J. 
GLOBAL L. & BUS. 1, 4 n.8 (2015) (explaining that “a surplus-maximizing 
modification is Pareto-efficient”); Maurice E. Stucke, Morality and Antitrust, 2006 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 443, 446 n.4 (2006) (arguing economic efficiency is 
maximized by both Pareto efficiency and technological efficiency). 
 149. Supra Table 1. 
 150. See Jules L. Coleman, Markets, Methods, Morals and the Law, 66 ALA. L. 
REV. 169, 186 (2014) (providing examples of how to achieve the demanding 
conditions under which the Coase Theorem functions best). 
 151. See POSNER, supra note 31, at 10 (providing an example of how the clear 
initial allocation of property rights will lead to economic efficiency); see generally 
Coase, supra note 31.  
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If TrainCo is given the right to burn farmland without 
liability, it will immediately act to maximize profits by running 7 
trains a day—giving it a $1,350 profit and Farmer a $100 profit. 
This knee-jerk business choice maximizes TrainCo’s immediate 
profits, but does not reach economic efficiency (i.e., other courses 
of action will result in a higher total surplus). Acting in his 
self-interest, Farmer will propose a trade,152 whereby TrainCo 
reduces its trains per day in exchange for a payment of $Y, such 
that TrainCo’s profit plus $Y exceeds its maximum income without 
trading ($1,350).153 Behaving to maximize income, TrainCo will 
accept the proposal.154 
Likewise, Farmer will engage in a trade whereby his income 
less a payment of $Y exceeds the $100 he is currently making with 
seven trains running.155 Wanting to maximize the total surplus 
that he may share in, Farmer will propose a trade where TrainCo 
runs four trains a day and receives a payment of $Y, which will be 
between $451 and $599—guaranteeing that both parties make 
more money with four trains running than seven.156 They are free 
to negotiate the exact amount of $Y, but regardless of the amount 
settled out, the parties will reach the efficient outcome of $1,600 
total surplus.157 
Next, assume the same situation, except the government 
clearly allocates to Farmer the right to recover damages, such that 
TrainCo makes payments to Farmer to cover any damages 
sustained. This new information is described below.158 Note that 
                                                                                                     
 152. This trade could likewise be proposed by TrainCo with the same terms. 
 153. See POSNER, supra note 31, at 10 (providing a similar railroad and 
farmland example of Coase’s Theorem).  
 154. Id. 
 155. Id.  
 156. Id. Farmer makes $700 with four trains running and he pays, at most, 
$599—leaving him with at least $101, which is $1 more than he made with seven 
trains running. TrainCo makes $900 with four trains running and receives, at 
minimum, $451—totaling at least $1351, which is $1 more than he made with 
seven trains running. 
 157. Id.; Farmer will make $700 – $Y. TrainCo will make $900 + $Y. The total 
surplus is ($700 – $Y) + ($900 + $Y), which equals $1,600 for all values of Y. 
 158. Infra Table 2.  
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the total surplus does not change; only the allocation of the surplus 
is different.159 
Table 2—Coase Theorem 
















0 $0 $0 $1500 $0 $1500 
1 $225 $25 $1300 $200 $1525 
2 $450 $50 $1100 $400 $1550 
3 $675 $75 $900 $600 $1575 
4 $900 $100 $700 $800 $1600 
5 $1075 $75 $500 $1000 $1575 
6 $1250 $50 $300 $1200 $1550 
7 $1350 -$50 $100 $1400 $1450 
8 $1300 -$200 $0 $1500 $1300 
 
In this situation, the parties will again negotiate a settlement 
whereby four trains run daily. Here, TrainCo will offer some 
amount between $1 and $99 (plus damages) to Farmer to let it run 
four trains per day. It will propose to run four trains per day 
because that produces the greatest surplus that it may share. This 
offer ensures that Farmer will receive $700 from crops, $800 in 
damages, and an additional $1–$99, which in total exceeds 
Farmer’s maximum profit absent trading ($1500).160 Likewise, 
                                                                                                     
 159. Compare infra Table 2, with supra Table 1.  
 160. Supra Table 2. 
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TrainCo will enjoy $900 in income less $800 in damages and less 
between $1 and $99 in payment to Farmer, leaving him with 
between $1–$99, which is more profit than with zero trains 
running ($0).161 Again, inter-firm transactions arrive at an efficient 
outcome by allowing the parties to trade among themselves to 
distribute property rights (i.e., the right run or stop trains) to the 
parties that most value them.162  
While the above example deals with a negative externality 
(fires caused by the running of the train), Coase Theorem is 
likewise applicable to situations involving positive 
externalities— external benefits created by market activity.163 
Patenting AI technologies is properly treated as such 
because— depending on how the government allocates the right to 
obtain a patent—it potentially creates benefits for parties outside 
the initial sale of software (e.g., software programmers, engineers, 
product designers, downstream users or owners of the software, 
etc.).164 Analyzing these rights as externalities is consistent with 
prior literature on extrinsic benefits arising from information 
creation and dissemination.165  
                                                                                                     
 161. Supra Table 2.  
 162. See generally Coase, supra note 31.  
 163. See Christopher J. Coyne & Peter T. Leeson, Who’s to Protect 
Cyberspace?, 1 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 473, 479 (2005) (discussing positive 
externalities, such as a scientific research breakthrough); Brett M. Frischmann, 
Speech, Spillovers, and the First Amendment, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 301, 305–06 
(2008) (explaining positive externalities as benefits freely realized by someone 
due to the actions of another). 
 164. See Paul E. McGreal, On the Cost Disease and Legal Education, 66 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 631, 637 (2016) (discussing positive externalities); Coyne & 
Leeson, supra note 163, at 479 (explaining how goods creating positive 
externalities are under-supplied in the market because of the free-rider problem 
of non-rivalrous goods). 
 165. See Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy 
of “Rights Management”, 97 MICH. L. REV. 462, 546 (1998) (discussing value 
generated by “transactions in information” and stating that “mass media 
products” that create positive externalities will be underproduced in an 
unregulated market); C. Edwin Baker, Giving the Audience What It Wants, 58 
OHIO ST. L.J. 311, 350–66 (1997) (discussing the positive externalities created by 
mass media); Daniel J. Gifford, The Damaging Impact of the Eastman Kodak 
Precedent Upon Product Competition: Antitrust Law in Need of Correction, 72 
WASH. U. L.Q. 1507, 1507 n.1 (1994) (explaining the “diffusion of skills and 
knowledge” occurs as positive externalities as new products and technology are 
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In the presence of positive externalities, firms underproduce 
goods for sale because they base manufacturing decisions only on 
the value inherent in the good (e.g., the value of the inventing AI), 
rather than considering the net social value created (e.g., the value 
of the AI plus the value of the positive externality—the AI 
patents).166 This failure to consider the value of positive 
externalities when deciding output means software companies will 
cease to manufacture even while the net public value of the good 
still exceeds production costs.167 This is not an economically 
efficient situation, as one party’s (the public’s) situation could be 
improved (by being able to buy goods at or below their net utility 
to the consumer), but the producer will cease production of goods 
while there are still net marginal gains to be had on additional 
units.168 
For example, assume that the public will buy each unit of 
inventing AI for $50 and that each unit sold will create $10 in 
social welfare associated with AI patents.169 Assume that the per 
unit cost of production for the software company increases with 
each unit produced, such that the 100th unit produced costs $30.01 
to make, the 101st costs $30.02, etc.170 If a software company is 
unable to realize the $10 in value associated with the patent (e.g., 
if the patent rights are assigned to some other party), then it will 
cease production where costs to manufacture another unit are $50. 
This is inefficient. Production is ceasing where cost to produce 
                                                                                                     
developed). 
 166. See Coyne & Leeson, supra note 163, at 479 (explaining goods creating 
positive externalities are typically under supplied in the market).  
 167. See Jeffrey Standen, The Exclusionary Rule and Damages: An Economic 
Comparison of Private Remedies for Unconstitutional Police Conduct, 2000 B.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1443, 1447–48 (2000) (arguing deterrence of unconstitutional police 
conduct is a positive externality that is likely to be underproduced if certain 
conditions are met); Lawrence B. Solum, Public Legal Reason, 92 VA. L. REV. 1449, 
1457–58 (2006). 
 168. See Coyne & Leeson, supra note 163, at 479 (describing that goods that 
create positive externalities will be under supplied and lead the unregulated 
market to be inefficient).  
 169. Assuming consistent consumer demand and patent value is unrealistic 
but appropriate for this example.  
 170. Again, this is an unrealistic assumption as production costs usually 
decrease with quantity produced but the assumption does not harm the example.  
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($50) is still below the total social welfare produced ($60). The next 
unit produced (assuming it costs $50.01 to make) would create a 
social welfare gain of $9.99 (the $50 inherent value of the AI + the 
$10 value of the patent – the $50.01 cost to produce).  
This presents the question of to whom the Patent Office should 
grant AI patents if it is attempting to maximize net surplus (i.e., 
social welfare) by allowing software companies to realize the full 
value of their AI and thus produce at an economically efficient 
level.171 Potential receipts of such rights include programmers, 
software companies, AI users, downstream technical experts, 
product engineers, etc.? Within the bounds of no transaction costs 
and perfect information, Coase Theorem renders this question 
superfluous.172 It does not matter to whom the patent rights are 
allocated because the party that most values them will purchase 
the patent and this value will trickle upstream to the software 
company.173  
Returning to our example, assume that the government 
allocates AI patent rights to any downstream party that identifies 
a novel invention made by AI—a situation discussed by Abbott.174 
Likewise, assume companies that purchase AI and use it to invent 
(“AI users”) value patent rights at their maximum level ($10), with 
all other parties holding them in lesser esteem.175 In this situation, 
the AI user will pay $50 to the software company to buy the AI.176 
Assuming costless transactions, it will also be willing to pay up to 
$10 to the downstream party for the patent rights.177 With perfect 
information, the downstream party would have previously realized 
                                                                                                     
 171. See Gaviria, supra note 148, at 4 n.8 (maximizing net surplus is Pareto 
optimal). 
 172. See generally Coase, supra note 31. 
 173. Id. 
 174. See Abbott, supra note 9, at 1098 (“For the purposes of this Article, 
assuming that a computer cannot be an inventor, individuals who subsequently 
‘discover’ computational inventions by mentally recognizing and appreciating 
their significance would likely qualify as inventors.”). Abbott does not recommend 
this allocation from a policy perspective, but it serves well as an example in this 
instance. 
 175. See Coase, supra note 31 (stating that in the absence of transaction costs 
the party that most values a property right will bargain to hold that right).   
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
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it will not be able to secure the patent rights unless the software 
company produces and sells the particular copy of the software 
used in inventing the new technology.178 With this in mind, the 
software company will demand a payment of up to $10 from the 
downstream party (leaving that party with a small gain) or it will 
not manufacture that copy of the software (and the downstream 
party loses out on all income). Through this stream of costless 
transactions, the full $60 in value ends up with the software 
company, and it will be incentivized to produce at an efficient level 
(up to the point where the cost of manufacture is $60). 
This example is (admittedly) a bit unrealistic but so are 
Coase’s assumptions of perfect information and costless 
transactions. It does, however, depict how inter-firm transactions 
ensure ownership of rights by the party that most values them and 
ensures the full value of economic activity is secured by a 
manufacturer. The manufacturer will then produce at an 
economically efficient level where production cost equals social 
welfare (net surplus) produced.179 These conclusions provide 
insight into Coase’s holding, namely that, regardless of the initial 
allocation of an entitlement, software companies will manufacture 
inventing AI at an economically efficient level in the presence of 
zero transaction costs and perfect information.180 These 
assumptions do not, of course, hold true in reality.181 With that in 
mind, this Article will later attempt to mimic this efficient state of 
affairs in the presence of transaction costs, as in the real world.182 
B. Using Coase Theorem to Construct Policy 
                                                                                                     
 178. See Ravid & Liu, supra note 121, at 2236 (explaining a patent owner can 
exclude others who “independently invent” inventions similar to his or her 
system).  
 179. See POSNER, supra note 31, at 10 (providing an example of how costless 
transactions will allow a right to be put the most productive use regardless of its 
initial assignment).  
 180. See Coase, supra note 31, at 8 (arguing the most efficient outcome will 
occur if the initial determination of rights is clear and transactions are costless).   
 181. See id. at 15 (acknowledging the assumptions that transactions are 
costless and perfect information are unrealistic). 
 182. Infra Part III.B.  
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Coase recognized his assumptions do not represent the real 
world and pragmatism must be considered when constructing 
policy.183 His theorem thus proves to be a useful tool to begin 
analysis of entitlement allocation.184 Transaction costs do exist and 
must be contemplated when implementing new policy.185 
Legislators should therefore attempt to effectuate a system in 
reality that most closely mimics an idealized Coasean market186 to 
bring about an efficient state of affairs.187 
Commenters suggest two means by which Coase’s insights can 
be implemented in the real world188—both of which are intended to 
minimize expenditures arising from inter-firm trading.189 High 
transaction costs detract from efficient allocation of resources, and 
in the worst case scenario, completely impede inter-firm trading.190 
                                                                                                     
 183. See Gareth Porter, Pollution Standards and Trade: The “Environmental 
Assimilative Capacity” Argument, 4 GEO. PUB. POL’Y REV. 49, 63 (1998) 
(acknowledging that in reality transaction costs do exist). 
 184. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability 
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1096 
(1972) (stating Coase’s Theorem and its assumption of no transaction costs is a 
good starting point for an entitlement allocation analysis). 
 185. See Porter, supra note 183, at 63 (discussing that transaction costs in the 
real world must be taken into account to provide effective policy).  
 186. See HIRSCH, supra note 26, at 20 (explaining if transactions costs are not 
zero, efficiency is assisted if the property right is initially “assigned to the party 
who would normally buy it”); Coleman, supra note 150, at 186 (explaining how in 
many situations the costs of determining who “our bargaining partners are can 
be too high for bargaining to work”); Michael I. Swygert & Katherine Earle Yanes, 
A Unified Theory of Justice: The Integration of Fairness into Efficiency, 73 WASH. 
L. REV. 249, 288 (1998) (stating users of the Coase Theorem must remember that 
the “Coasean world” differs from the real world). 
 187. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 184, at 1096–97 (explaining that 
when there are transaction costs, society can assist in allocating entitlements to 
achieve efficiency).   
 188. See Seth D. Harris, Coase’s Paradox and the Inefficiency of Permanent 
Strike Replacements, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 1185, 1193–94 (2002) (stating that when 
Coase’s assumptions are relaxed, legal rules can be used to further economic 
efficiency by designing them to minimize transactions or legal rules can impose a 
solution that “approximates the efficient agreement”). 
 189. See Kelly, supra note 34, at 864 (stating that policymakers can minimize 
transaction costs “by lowering the costs of borrowing or by allocating entitlements 
efficiently so that bargaining is unnecessary”). 
 190. See Pierre Schlag, An Appreciative Comment on Coase’s The Problem of 
Social Cost: A View from the Left, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 919, 923 (1986) (explaining 
how in reality transactions costs could be so high that the allocation of 
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Specifically, where gains from trade are outweighed by transaction 
costs, parties have no incentive to bargain,191 and thus, may fail to 
reach the efficient allocation of property predicted by Coase. At 
minimum, transaction costs deduct from economic surplus.192 
The first manner to approximate a Coasean property 
allocation is to assign entitlements to the party that most values 
them.193 This type of rule mimics Coase Theorem by avoiding 
transaction costs all together; there is no need to engage in trades 
to place an entitlement in the hands of a party that maximally 
values it if that party holds the initial assignment.194 In the 
aggregate, this policy will—consistent with Coase Theorem—
maximize net surplus and achieve economic efficiency.195 
Similarly, entitlements can be distributed to minimize 
transaction costs.196 In such a situation, efficient allocation (as 
predicted by Coase) is feasible where the transaction cost remains 
below the potential gains from trade.197 As a corollary, it is 
preferable to minimize the number of parties involved in a transfer 
because costs increase on a per party basis.198 Of course, the goal 
of minimizing transaction costs is furthered by following the first 
policy recommendation—simply allocating rights to the party that 
most values them (eliminating the need for any transaction and 
                                                                                                     
entitlements will not change after the initial allocation). 
 191. See Kelly, supra note 34, at 864 (describing how transaction costs can 
prevent parties from reaching the most efficient outcome for all). 
 192. Id. 
 193. See Hovenkamp, supra note 26, at 638 (describing that policymakers 
could assign the “initial allocation to the highest value user” so trading of the 
entitlement is not needed). 
 194. See HIRSCH, supra note 26, at 20 (stating that when transaction costs are 
high, efficiency is advanced if the party who would buy the property right is 
initially assigned that right). 
 195. Id. 
 196. See Kelly, supra note 34, at 864 (using legal rules to minimize 
transaction costs will move the market towards the most efficient point). 
 197. See Harris, supra note 188, at 1193–94 (explaining the two ways legal 
rules can improve economic efficiency). 
 198. See Porter, supra note 183, at 63 (acknowledging that relaxing Coase’s 
zero transaction costs assumption makes the bargaining approach impractical for 
large groups). 
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associated cost).199 The following Part looks to how this insight can 
be implemented into policy. 
IV. Coasean Analysis of Patent Ownership 
Coasean assignment of property entitlements is a function of 
the parties’ respective valuations of the good, transaction costs, 
and the number of firms involved in the matter.200 As discussed 
above, rights should be allocated to whomever most values them 
(which minimizes transaction costs).201 The below presents a 
multi-step analysis towards efficient allocation of patent rights for 
AI inventions.202 
This Part begins by discussing various candidates to whom AI 
patent rights might be assigned. Benefits arising therefrom are 
evaluated, and each benefit is analyzed to determine whether—
and to what quantum—it accrues to a respective candidate for 
patent ownership.203 From this, it is possible to determine which 
party in the AI invention lifecycle most values the ability to secure 
AI patents. 
Building from this information, the Article concludes by 
making Coasean policy suggestions pertaining to the assignment 
of ownership rights for AI patents.204 The analysis determines 
that—to maximize social welfare—these rights should be allotted 
to AI users who utilize the software for invention because they hold 
these patents in greatest value. This assignment minimizes 
transaction costs.205 In turn, such a policy ensures substantial 
                                                                                                     
 199. See HIRSCH, supra note 26, at 20 (making the argument that efficiency is 
improved if property rights are initially assigned to the party who would 
ultimately buy the right). 
 200. See Porter, supra note 183, at 62–63 (stating a Coasean analysis is based 
on willingness to bargain, transaction costs, and becomes impractical as the 
number of parties increases).  
 201. See Kelly, supra note 34, at 864 (stating that if property rights are 
initially allocated to the party who would eventually buy them then efficiency is 
improved). 
 202. Infra subparts IV.A–D. 
 203. Infra subparts IV.A–C. 
 204. Infra Part V. 
 205. See Kelly, supra note 34, at 865 (explaining how assigning property 
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internalization of positive externalities and economic efficiency 
(i.e., maximum social welfare).206 
A. Types of Patent Value 
Patent ownership creates value in a variety of manners.207 
Depending on the situation, these benefits may (or may not) accrue 
themselves to particular owners.208 Patents have historically been 
seen as a manner for a firm to insulate itself from competition and 
charge supra-competitive prices.209 While this remains a focus of 
patent strategy, a variety of additional benefits have presented 
themselves as the field has matured.210 These are discussed below. 
Owning a patent serves a signaling function in the 
entrepreneurial financing market.211 Signals allow a party to incur 
some cost to convey information about itself to outside firms.212 
Securing a patent transmits a positive message about the state of 
                                                                                                     
rights initially to those who value the right most minimizes transaction costs). 
 206. See Coyne & Leeson, supra note 163, at 479 (demonstrating how positive 
externalities that are not internalized by firms creating them lead to an inefficient 
market).  
 207. See David H. Hsu & Rosemarie H. Ziedonis, Resources as Dual Sources 
of Advantage: Implications for Valuing Entrepreneurial-Firm Patents, 34 
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 761, 762 (2013) (arguing that patents provide an advantage 
as a signaling devices and that patents confer an even greater advantage in 
“strategic factor markets”); Vincent J. Roth, Will FDA Data Exclusivity Make 
Biologic Patents Passé?, 29 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 249, 273 
(2013) (outlining the various ways patents create value). 
 208. See Hsu & Ziedonis, supra note 207, at 766 (arguing the signaling 
function of patents is “particularly important for new ventures”). 
 209. See Andrew Chin, Teaching Patents as Real Options, 95 N.C. L. REV. 
1433, 1446 (2017) (explaining that a patent owner likely will try to charge high 
prices during the patent grant period to obtain higher profits).  
 210. See Knut Blind et al., Motives to Patent: Empirical Evidence from 
Germany, 35 RES. POL’Y 655, 655 (2006) (arguing the value of patents has 
increased over time). 
 211. See Hsu & Ziedonis, supra note 207, at 764 (discussing how the 
“informational imperfections” in entrepreneurial markets make patent signaling 
effects valuable). 
 212. See Clark D. Asay, The Informational Value of Patents, 31 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 259, 277 (2016) (discussing how a firm’s patent can translate into an 
indication of a firm’s positive value in the marketplace). 
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the firm’s research and development,213 which may lead to 
successfully obtaining outside investment.214 
Likewise, patents serve two distinct blocking functions, 
whereby a patentee limits the scope of a rival’s strategic 
behavior.215 Offensive blocking occurs when a party secures a 
patent not with the hopes of utilizing the technology but rather to 
preclude competitors from implementing the claimed inventions to 
compete with the patentee’s own offerings.216 Defensive blocking 
prevents other firms from patenting relevant technologies and 
then inhibiting a firm’s capacity to manufacture goods.217 In the 
                                                                                                     
 213. See Paul J. Heald, A Transaction Costs Theory of Patent Law, 66 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 473, 478 (2005) (discussing that patents can be a signal that a firm has a 
high research and development capacity (citing Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 
U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 627–28 (2002))). 
 214. See Dov Solomon & Miriam Bitton, Intellectual Property Securitization, 
33 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 125, 159 (2015) (arguing that one reason companies 
obtain patents is to secure outside investment); Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High 
Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley 
Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1306 (2009) (discussing how “VC 
investors rely on patents in their investment decisions”); Kevin G. Rivette, Henry 
R. Nothhaft & David Kline, Discovering New Value in Intellectual Property, 78 
HARV. BUS. REV. 54, 60 (2000) (stating that companies can “repackage” their 
patents to attract new investors); Hsu & Ziedonis, supra note 207, at 774  
[W]e find that (1) patents are more influential for founders 
lacking prior entrepreneurial success in securing initial funds 
from prominent VCs; (2) patents induce steeper valuation 
adjustments in earlier rounds of VC financing; and 
(3) conditioned on an IPO exit, patents play a more influential 
role in bridging information gaps with public investors when 
start-ups lack prominent VC investors. 
 215. See Blind et al., supra note 210, at 657 (explaining offensive blocking and 
defensive blocking patents); T. Randolph Beard et al., Quantifying the Cost of 
Substandard Patents: Some Preliminary Evidence, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH. 240, 245 
(2010) (arguing a “loose” patent system leads to a misallocation of resources, 
including more defensive patents and blocking patents); Steven C. Carlson, 
Patent Pools and the Antitrust Dilemma, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 359, 367 (1999) 
(“Patentees, too, may deliberately acquire blocking positions as a strategic move 
to frustrate the patenting programs of competitors.” (citations omitted)). 
 216. See Blind et al., supra note 210, at 657 (providing that offensive blocking 
patents are patents obtained to prevent other firms in the same or a closely 
related field from using the technical inventions of the firm holding the patent). 
 217. See Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex 
Patent Ecosystem and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 
297, 320–21 (2010) (identifying a defensive strategy of “obtaining a large portfolio 
of patents . . . to prevent competitors from blocking its new products”). 
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defensive aspect, the patentee is acting only to ensure that it has 
the right to use strategically relevant technologies.218 
Patents likewise serve a negotiation-facilitating 
function— both before and during litigation.219 Parties commonly 
facilitate manufacture by cross-licensing relevant portfolios to 
each other, such that both can operate without the threat of 
infringement litigation.220 Absent a patent portfolio to 
cross-license, a manufacturer may incur licensing fees or risk 
infringement litigation.221 Likewise, should a patentee be sued for 
patent infringement, it has the ability to counter-claim for 
infringement of its own patents, creating incentives for the 
plaintiff to settle on reasonable terms or end the suit via 
cross-license.222 
Lastly, patents may create an income stream independent of 
product manufacture.223 This value is obtained via litigation or 
licensing efforts,224 whereby firms sell the right to use the patented 
                                                                                                     
 218. See id. at 321 (“In defensive contexts, patents are used to ward off suits, 
as well as to gain access to technology and to further technological adoption.”). 
 219. See Joshua Chao, Tax Incentives for Innovation in a Modern IP 
Ecosystem, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 753, 761 (2013) (explaining that 
companies strategically use cross licensing agreements to resolve potential or 
actual legal disputes).  
 220. See id. at 760–61 (describing the process of cross licensure as an option 
for companies to prevent litigation in manufacturing situations involving 
semiconductor production); see also Rivette, Nothhaft & Kline, supra note 214, at 
57 (“[Dell] used its patents as the collateral for a $16 billion cross-licensing deal 
with IBM that provides it with lower cost components. Dell is freed from having 
to pay IBM tens of millions of dollars in royalties, which makes Dell more price 
competitive.”). 
 221. See Robert E. Thomas, Debugging Software Patents: Increasing 
Innovation and Reducing Uncertainty in the Judicial Reform of Software Patent 
Law, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 191, 210 (2008) (stating small 
companies without patents may either negotiate license fees without leverage or 
risk litigation). 
 222. Cf. Aria Soroudi, Comment, Defeating Trolls: The Impact of Octane and 
Highmark on Patent Trolls, 35 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 319, 323–24 (2015) (stating 
that parties cannot counter-claim or use patent agreements against patent 
trolls—a common settlement method in patent disputes—because patent trolls do 
not use patented inventions). 
 223. See Rivette, Nothhaft & Kline, supra note 214, at 55–56 (explaining how 
a former Chief Financial Officer at IBM viewed patent licensing royalties as 
“largely free cash flow” independent of production). 
 224. See id. at 56 (citing both licensing and patent infringement suits as two 
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invention.225 This strategy may mimic the business model adopted 
by patent assertion entities (also known as patent trolls).226  
B. Patent Valuation as a Function of Market Participation 
This subpart describes why, among the above discussed 
sources of patent value, the majority are maximized if the owner 
participates in a market relating to the patented technology. It 
follows that patents are most valuable to market participants, and 
as presented below, AI users (parties using the software to invent) 
are most likely to be marketplace participants. Thus, AI users will, 
in all probability, maximally value the patents arising therefrom. 
The fact that other parties can lucratively engage in patent 
monetization (e.g., patent licensing and litigation) does not 
dissuade this conclusion. 
The traditionally recognized benefit of a patent—market 
exclusivity227—is enjoyable only by parties that participate in the 
relevant market.228 Elimination of competition is valueless if a 
patentee does not participate in relevant commerce, and thus, is 
unable to enjoy benefits such as supracompetitive pricing229 and 
advantages in manufacturing efficiency.230 Market participants 
                                                                                                     
values of patents). 
 225. See id. at 57 (describing a licensing agreement between Dell and IBM 
whereby Dell saved money using licensing agreements as a way to avoid paying 
royalties to IBM to use IBM’s patented components). 
 226. See Ted Sichelman, The Vonage Trilogy: A Case Study in “Patent 
Bullying”, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 543, 547–58 (2014) (describing the patent troll 
goals as earning revenue from patent litigation and licensing). 
 227. See Chin, supra note 209, at 1436 (stating that the value the patent 
derives is from the right to exclude others from otherwise profiting off of the 
invention). 
 228. See Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the 
Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2128 (2013) (contrasting the non-practicing 
entity—entity not participating in the market—with the traditional strategies of 
practicing entities, including the competitive benefits against other market 
participants). 
 229. See Chin, supra note 209, at 1446 (stating that firms may only obtain 
supracompetitive profits when the patents cover all close substitutes, implying 
that a company would only be able to reap these supracompetitive profits if they 
involved themselves in the same marketplace as competitors). 
 230. See Ofer Tur-Sinai, The Endowment Effect in IP Transactions: The Case 
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will thus most value patent ownership with regard to market 
exclusivity. 
The conclusion is consistent for signaling in the venture 
capital market and using patents for blocking purposes. Parties 
that are not participating in the market—and have no intent to do 
so in the future—need not raise capital for endeavors in that field, 
and positive signals regarding the firm’s research are essentially 
valueless. Similarly, blocking patents—which proscribe 
competitors’ business options—are without worth if a party is not 
a market participant and has no competitors.231 
With regard to the use as negotiation tools, patents are (again) 
most valuable to firms participating in commerce.232 Companies 
not in the market cannot face the threat of patent infringement 
litigation and cannot have their planned business endeavors 
limited by competitors’ patent rights.233 Absent commercial 
activity, a company will not engage in infringing activities or plan 
future market activities.234 Without these threats, firms have no 
need to engage in cross-licensing to terminate potential litigation 
or avoid licensing costs.235 Accordingly, patents create no value via 
facilitating negotiations for parties that do not engage in relevant 
markets. 
The final source of patent value—monetization via licensing 
and litigation236—is the sole patent benefit that is not 
                                                                                                     
Against Debiasing, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 117, 135 n.102 (2011) 
(describing the situation in which a patent owner foregoes licensing technology 
which increased the patent owner’s profitability to gain a “significant competitive 
advantage”).  
 231. See Chien, supra note 217, at 320–21 (describing the blocking benefits of 
patents and how companies go about exploiting these benefits). 
 232. See Chao, supra note 219, at 761 (identifying the negotiation benefits of 
licensing agreements to resolve potential litigation). 
 233. See Soroudi, supra note 222, at 323–24 (highlighting the issue of 
counter-suing non-practicing entities due to their lack of participation in the 
market through the production of patented inventions). 
 234. Cf. id. (characterizing the issues associated with non-practicing entities 
not participating in the market through use of patented inventions). 
 235. See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 228, at 2129–30 (comparing the 
non-practicing entity goal of monetizing profit with the practicing entity 
settlement with cross-licensing with other practicing entities).  
 236. See Brian J. Love & James Yoon, Predictably Expensive: A Critical Look 
at Patent Litigation in the Eastern District of Texas, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 3 
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disproportionately valuable to market participants.237 Essentially 
any patentee can attempt to monetize its patents by selling the 
rights to practice the technology; the business model only requires 
patent ownership and startup funds.238 This type of patent value 
is thus equivalent for all parties.239 Of course, market participants 
may have the technical knowledge necessary for licensing, which 
creates efficiencies and increases a patent’s licensing value for 
market participants.240  
In summary, all relevant benefits arising from patent 
ownership are most valuable when the patentee participates in the 
relevant marketplace.241 It is true that any owner can transfer 
their patent to a market participant,242 but that is not equivalent 
to assigning the initial entitlement to the party that most values 
it. This conclusion is warranted in light of the transaction costs 
associated with patent assignment (i.e., expenditures associated 
with selling the patent to a market participant who most values 
the patent), which decrease the value of the patent.243  
                                                                                                     
(2017) (listing the sole purpose of patent troll companies as “monetizing patent 
rights through litigation”). 
 237. See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 228, at 2128–29 (identifying the 
similarities of non-practicing entities and practicing entities in the way they use 
patent litigation). 
 238. See Matthew Fawcett & Jeremiah Chan, March of the Trolls: Footsteps 
Getting Louder, 13 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 1, 12 (2008) (listing the only real 
expense as buying patents and hiring lawyers and consultants on a contingency 
basis). 
 239. See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 228, at 2131–32 (providing two 
hypothetical examples of non-practicing entities and practicing entities engaging 
in licensing and litigation and arriving at the same revenue). 
 240. Cf. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., SUCCESSFUL TECHNOLOGY 
LICENSING 6 (2015), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/licensing/903/ 
wipo_pub_903.pdf (arguing that technical knowledge is required to maximize the 
value on both sides of a licensing negotiation). 
 241. Supra notes 231–235 and accompanying text. 
 242. See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 228, at 2122 (stating that patents 
may be bought and sold, and thus the party holding the patent at the time of the 
action can enforce the patent).  
 243. For instance, assume a patent is worth $100 to a market participant, but 
the right to obtain the patent was assigned to a non-participant. A market 
participant may pay $100 for the patent, but the non-participant seller will only 
receive $99 after it pays $1 in transaction costs (e.g., legal fees). Thus, the patent 
is worth $100 to a market participant, but only $99 to a non-participant.  
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C. Assignment of Patent Rights 
The literature on real world application of Coase Theorem 
holds that—in order to maximize economic efficiency—property 
entitlements should be allocated to the party that most values 
them.244 As discussed in the above subsection, market participants 
will maximally value AI patent rights.245 There is thus only one 
issue left towards determining what party should be entitled to AI 
patents to maximize economic efficiency: who in the AI invention 
timeline has the highest probably of engaging in commerce 
associated with AI-produced invention? As discussed below, AI 
users (those using the software to invent) are most likely market 
participants, and thus, should be entitled to receive AI patents.246 
There are a host of parties involved in AI innovation that 
might be considered for patent ownership.247 The software’s 
lifecycle begins with researchers and programmers (collectively 
programmers) who design and write the AI package.248 “Software 
companies” make and distribute the software available for 
purchase or license.249 These firms may employ programmers.250 
The AI is subsequently purchased or licensed by a firm for use in 
creating AI inventions in a particular field (hereinafter AI users), 
and the results are analyzed for market relevance and 
                                                                                                     
 244. See Kelly, supra note 34, at 864 (stating that if property rights are 
initially allocated to the party who would eventually buy them, efficiency is 
improved). 
 245. Supra notes 231–235 and accompanying text. 
 246. Infra notes 268–269 and accompanying text.  
 247. See Abbott, supra note 9, at 1114 (identifying various potential entities 
who would have a vested interest in patent ownership); see also Samuelson, supra 
note 126, at 1190 (discussing the issue from the copyright perspective). 
 248. See PLOTKIN, supra note 70, at 5–6 (explaining the process of 
programmers creating software). 
 249. See Bronwyn Fryer, High Tech the Old-Fashioned Way: An Interview 
with Tom Siebel of Siebel Systems, HARV. BUS. REV. (March 2001), 
https://hbr.org/2001/03/tom-siebel-of-siebel-systems-high-tech-the-old-fashioned-
way (last visited Dec. 16, 2018) (identifying a standard practice among competitor 
software companies of engineering and selling software products) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 250. See James Martin & Carma McClure, Buying Software off the Rack: 
Packages Can Be the Solution to the Software Shortage, 61 HARV. BUS. REV. 32, 33 
(1983) (discussing the employment of programmers in “software houses”). 
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patentability by technically trained “reviewers.”251 These experts 
are likely employees of AI users.252 Any number of additional 
downstream parties may come into contact with the AI-produced 
inventions, including product engineers, technical experts, and 
others exposed to the information.253 The following analysis of 
these parties determines that AI users are most likely to 
participate in the market relevant to their AI inventions, and thus, 
should be allocated relevant patent rights to maximize social 
welfare. 
Software companies and programmers in the AI innovation 
realm are unlikely to be engaged in commerce specific to any 
particular area of invention beyond the creation of AI.254 For 
instance, IBM (a software company) and its employees (including 
programmers) labored to create and distribute one of the better 
known pieces of AI—called “Watson”255—which is used in a variety 
                                                                                                     
 251. Cf. Donal O’Connell, How to Best Run a Patent Review Board, IPEG 
(2014), https://www.ipeg.com/how-to-best-run-a-patent-review-board/ (last visited 
Dec. 4, 2018) (discussing company use of patent review processes to determine 
patentability of company creations) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 252. See id. (discussing the employment of patent reviewers directly by the 
companies creating the potentially patentable material).  
 253. See supra note 219 and accompanying text (discussing the usefulness of 
cross-licensing opportunities for companies focusing in technology production 
based on the frequency of working with patented material created by other 
entities). 
 254. See Peter S. Menell, Envisioning Copyright Law’s Digital Future, 46 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 63, 74 (2002–2003) (discussing the highly specialized nature 
of programming at software companies). 
 255. See Libby Plummer, Why Isn’t IBM’s Watson Supercomputer Making 
Money?, WIRED (July 21, 2017), http://www.wired.co.uk/article/ibm-watson-
supercomputer-profit (last visited Dec. 4, 2018) (describing IBM’s Watson 
supercomputer) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also 
Abbott, supra note 9, at 1089 (describing IBM’s goals with developing the Watson 
supercomputer). 
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of fields including finance,256 law,257 and medicine.258 Despite being 
utilized in these areas, however, IBM has yet to open a law office 
or hospital.259 Software companies and programmers tend to 
remain within their area of expertise, as opposed to participating 
in the market for every field in which their AI might be 
employed.260 
In contrast, AI users (e.g., product manufacturers) are likely 
to participate in commerce relevant to the field of their AI 
innovations. These parties are disproportionately expected to 
purchase or license inventing software for the specific purpose of 
gaining a marketplace advantage though innovation.261 Examples 
of this phenomenon include General Electric (jet engines)262 and 
Hitachi (high-speed trains).263  
                                                                                                     
 256. See Jen Doll, ‘Jeopardy!’ Win Behind Him, Watson Seeks Billions on Wall 
Street, ATLANTIC (Mar. 6, 2012), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/03/jeopardy-win-behind-him-
watson-seeks-billions-wall-street/330903/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2018) (listing 
finance as an area IBM’s Watson is now being used) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 257. See Paul Lippe, What We Know and Need to Know About Watson, Esq., 
67 S.C. L. REV. 419, 427 (2016) (stating that IBM has started partnering with 
companies in numerous fields including law). 
 258. See Zina Moukheiber, Mayo Clinic Turns to IBM’s Watson to Match 
Cancer Patients with Clinical Trials, FORBES (Sept. 8, 2014, 8:00 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/zinamoukheiber/2014/09/08/mayo-clinic-turns-to-
ibms-watson-to-match-cancer-patients-with-clinical-trials/ (last visited Dec. 4, 
2018) (explaining how clinicians are using IBM’s Watson in the medical field for 
things such as selecting patients for clinical trials) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 259. See generally IBM Services, IBM, 
https://www.ibm.com/services?lnk=hpmse_ts&lnk2=learn (last visited Dec. 4, 
2018) (listing the services IBM does engage in excluding any reference to law 
offices or hospitals) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 260. See Menell, supra note 254, at 74 (discussing the highly specialized 
nature of programming).  
 261. See Michael A. Gollin, Using Intellectual Property to Improve 
Environmental Protection, 4 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 193, 197 (1991) (“[A]s with all 
innovation, an overarching goal is to gain a competitive advantage in the 
marketplace.”). 
 262. See Kurzweil, supra note 68, at 114 (discussing the use of genetic 
algorithms in the design of jet engines). 
 263. See PLOTKIN, supra note 70, at 60 (discussing the use of genetic 
algorithms to evolve the design of Hitachi trains to optimize aerodynamic 
performance). 
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There are a variety of individuals employed by software 
owners, including reviewers who evaluate AI inventions for 
market value or patentability and engineers who attempt to 
implement the idea in new inventions.264 While these downstream 
parties may have technical expertise germane to the relevant 
inventions—some commenters even argue these individuals may 
be “inventors” under current patent law265—they are likely to be 
employed by market participants rather than actually 
manufacturing or providing products or services.266 As such, the 
parties are unlikely to directly participate in relevant commerce.267 
Premised upon the above, it is most likely that AI users (firms 
using AI to create inventions for use in commerce) will be market 
participants. Such parties are expected, as discussed previously in 
Part IV.B, to most value AI patents. Accordingly—consistent with 
the idea that entitlements should be allocated to the party that 
most values them to mimic an idealized Coasean market268—AI 
users should be afforded the opportunity to patent inventions 
created by AI to achieve economic efficiency.269  
                                                                                                     
 264. See supra note 251 and accompanying text (discussing company use of 
patent review processes to determine patentability of company creations). 
 265. See Abbott, supra note 9, at 1098 (arguing that the person downstream 
who receives the computational inventions and recognizes their significance could 
qualify as the person who discovers the invention). 
 266. See supra notes 254–260 and accompanying text (discussing the 
tendency of software companies to employ programmers who engage specifically 
in the specialized market producing software to be used by production and service 
industries); see also Brad Smith, Intuit’s CEO on Building A Design-Driven 
Company, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/01/intuits-ceo-on-
building-a-design-driven-company (last visited Dec. 4, 2018) (discussing Intuit’s 
situation in the market of only working with software and providing a product to 
be implemented in other business models) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review).  
 267. See supra notes 231–235 and accompanying text (demonstrating that the 
parties not participating in the actual manufacturing process are more likely to 
not engage directly in the relevant market). 
 268. See Kelly, supra note 34, at 864 (stating that if property rights are 
initially allocated to the party who would eventually buy them, efficiency is 
improved). 
 269. It is likewise notable that, beyond merely allocating these patent rights 
to parties that will most value them, allocating the rights in this manner likewise 
incentivizes the market participants to engage in further inventive activity. This 
leads to a relative increase in patentable inventions, and thus, value created via 
patents. 
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D. Considerations on Not Allocating Patent Rights to Software 
Companies 
The above analysis establishes that patent rights should be 
allocated to AI users. Several related points, however, warrant 
discussion in this final substantive part. Software companies 
may—in response to the grant of patent rights to AI 
users— attempt to circumvent this allocation by internalizing the 
invention process.270 In such a situation, the software company 
becomes an AI user and may secure related patents.271 Such 
artifice will not, however, work for reasons discussed below.272  
Further, some commenters disagree with the allocation of 
patent rights proposed herein, arguing that software companies 
should be entitled to AI patents (or AI copyrights).273 Beyond 
failing to allocate rights to those that most value them, such a 
policy creates inefficiencies by promoting patent troll activity274 
and creating substantial costs associated with the policing of 
relevant contracts.275 These points are discussed in the following 
subsections. 
1. Internalization of Invention by Software Firms 
                                                                                                     
 270. Infra notes 286–287 and accompanying text. 
 271. Infra notes 293–294 and accompanying text. 
 272. Infra notes 300–301 and accompanying text. 
 273. See, e.g., Abbott, supra note 9, at 1114–15 (“Ownership rights to 
computational inventions should vest in a computer’s owner because it would be 
most consistent with the way personal property . . . is treated in the United States 
and it would most incentivize computational invention.”); Wu, supra note 128, at 
138 (“[W]here neither the programmer nor the user meet the requirements of 
authorship to a copyrightable work, the court should assign the copyright to 
whoever owns the copyright to the computer program.”). 
 274. See James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE 
Disputes, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 387, 423 (2014) (arguing that assigning patents to 
non-practicing entities increases litigation and costs for market participants). 
 275. See Michael A. Carrier, Two Puzzles Resolved: Of the Schumpeter-Arrow 
Stalemate and Pharmaceutical Innovation Markets, 93 IOWA L. REV. 393, 406 n.59 
(2008) (“Monitoring costs, which include policing costs of enforcing contracts, 
reduce the value of property rights.” (citing John Lunn, The Roles of Property 
Rights and Market Power in Appropriating Innovative Output, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 
423, 425 (1985))). 
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The proposed allocation of patent rights to AI users raises the 
issue of how software companies will react. An expected response 
is to capture the value of these patents by internalizing AI 
invention, such that software companies undertake the actions of 
an AI user and become a potential patentee for inventions arising 
therefrom. Should this artifice succeed, relevant property rights 
(patents) would not be allocated to market participants and 
economic efficiency would not be achieved.276 On this issue, a 
second work by Coase—The Nature of the Firm—describes why 
such internalization is unlikely.277 
In his study, Coase addressed the question of “why is not all 
production organized in a single large firm?”278 His answer was 
that economic activities are internalized where transaction costs 
associated with external contracts exceed the savings created by 
allowing an external firm to undertake a particular activity.279 An 
example is a company considering internalizing an economic 
activity which it can do it for $50 but which provides it with $60 of 
value. It will internalize the activity (and secure a $10 gain) unless 
it can be outsourced to obtain a larger aggregate benefit. With this 
in mind, even if an outside entity will undertake the same activity 
for $45, the company will internalize the job if the cost of 
contracting with the external party is $5.01 or more. Deducting the 
cost of outsourcing ($45) and transaction costs (at least $5.01) from 
the activity’s value ($60) leaves the firm in a worse position if it 
outsources (securing at most a $9.99 gain, instead of $10 from 
doing the act in house). The choice to internalize (or not) is thus a 
function of the benefit from an activity, costs of outsourcing, and 
costs of internalizing the act. As shown below, benefits associated 
with AI invention by software companies are substantially 
                                                                                                     
 276. See supra Parts IV.C–D (discussing the economic efficiency of giving 
patents to market participants).  
 277. See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 395 
(1937) (arguing that firms will externalize when the costs of internalization are 
greater than the costs of externalization). 
 278. Id. at 394. 
 279. See id. at 395 (“[A] firm will tend to expand until the costs of organizing 
an extra transaction within the firm become equal to the costs of carrying out the 
same transaction by means of an exchange on the open market or the costs of 
organizing in another firm.”). 
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undermined by new information costs and is not expected to be 
financially viable. 
At first blush, it appears that software companies are likely to 
internalize the AI inventive process. They have the know-how to 
efficiently operate their software, are aware of the industries 
interested in AI invention (via past sales), and will enjoy the value 
of AI patents to which they would be entitled.280 These 
considerations favor a determination that software firms will 
internalize AI invention in a fiscally efficient manner (e.g., such 
that it costs less to internalize the activity relative to letting others 
do so).281 This conclusion, however, ignores substantial 
information costs associated with producing relevant inventions 
and associated patents. 
To utilize AI to create valuable inventions (which lead to 
valuable patents), a party must maintain significant 
organizational knowledge.282 Firms in any particular field have 
information relevant to identifying subject areas where invention 
will prove valuable as that market evolves, as there is no need to 
invent products with no future market value.283 An entity must 
likewise have the technical expertise necessary to identify a 
valuable invention produced by AI; invention cannot lead to patent 
value if no one recognizes which inventions are important.284 
Lastly, only a party actively participating in the market can assess 
its particular inventive needs relative to its private business plans; 
                                                                                                     
 280. See supra Part IV.C (discussing the benefits associated with patent 
ownership by software companies).  
 281. See Coase, supra note 277 (hypothesizing that firms will internalize costs 
until it is less expensive for the firm to externalize the cost or start another firm). 
 282. See Morten T. Hansen et al., What’s Your Strategy for Managing 
Knowledge?, 77 HARV. BUS. REV. 106, 106–07 (1999) (discussing how firms 
maintain organizational knowledge relevant to their field of expertise). 
 283. See Marco Verweij, Why Is the River Rhine Cleaner Than the Great Lakes 
(Despite Looser Regulation)?, 34 L. & SOC’Y REV. 1007, 1048 (2000) (“Firms have 
detailed knowledge of their cost structure, and they are well positioned to develop 
new technologies and to find efficient, practical solutions to [their] problems.”). 
 284. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Patents, Presumptions, and Public Notice, 86 
IND. L.J. 779, 781 (2011) (discussing the importance of technical knowledge to 
patenting activities). 
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this information is not available to outside firms and thus cannot 
be broadly used to invent the “right” new technologies.285 
These considerations leave software companies with an 
unenviable choice. They can either pay significant sums to hire 
technical experts and obtain necessary information from firms in 
the field, or they can produce inventions (and thus patents) of little 
value due to a want of needed information.286 In these situations, 
the cost to internalize invention will either rise significantly or the 
value from AI patents will fall precipitously, respectively. In 
neither instance can internalization of AI invention be expected to 
prove a net benefit, except in rare circumstances.287 Software 
companies cannot, therefore, be expected to internalize AI 
invention on a significant scale. 
2. Patent Troll Activity 
Beyond the prior discussion of benefits arising from patent 
ownership, a relevant secondary consideration is the social cost 
that may arise from AI patents. More specifically, it is prudent to 
determine how these patents might be monetized and the societal 
impact arising therefrom. This concern is germane to a primary 
issue in modern patent scholarship, namely attempts to discourage 
the patent assertion entity (also referred to as “patent troll”) 
business model.288 The below discusses how AI patents might 
                                                                                                     
 285. See Verweij, supra note 283, at 1048 (“Firms have detailed knowledge of 
their cost structure, and they are well positioned to develop new technologies and 
to find efficient, practical solutions to [their] problems.”). 
 286. See id. (arguing that the benefit of having inventors with specific 
knowledge of the industry and practice area to develop technology to address the 
market issues). 
 287. See, e.g., Aatif Sulleyman, Google AI Creates Its Own ‘Child’ AI that’s 
More Advanced than Systems Built by Humans, INDEPENDENT (Dec. 5 2017, 3:40 
PM), http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/google-
child-ai-bot-nasnet-automl-machine-learning-artificial-intelligence-a8093201. html 
(last visited Dec. 4, 2018) (describing Google’s production of an open source neural 
network software that markedly improved on the other available programs at the 
time) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 288. See W. Michael Schuster, Invalidity Assertion Entities and Inter Partes 
Review: Rent Seeking as a Tool to Discourage Patent Trolls, 51 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 1163, 1164 (2016) (discussing the development of Invalidity Assertion 
Entities and their use of Inter Partes Review to challenge the validity of patents 
1996 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1945 (2018) 
 
further troll litigation if these rights were allocated to software 
companies (in contrast to being allocated to AI users, as proposed 
herein). 
Societal costs associated with patent troll litigation are 
substantial.289 Activity of this nature cannot proceed, however, 
unless trolls are able to purchase patents.290 That end is furthered 
where—as discussed below—patentees have no means of 
financially exploiting a patent except selling it. This would be the 
situation for many AI patent owners if patent rights were given to 
parties other than market participants (e.g., software companies). 
There are limits on how software companies may monetize a 
patent. As specialized AI firms, these companies will not generally 
be engaged in commerce related to the field of the AI’s invention.291 
                                                                                                     
and target patent trolls); see also David Orozco, Administrative Patent Levers, 117 
PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 17 (2012) (expressing concerns related to the prevalence of 
patent trolls and their negative impact on business); Daniel R. Cahoy, 9 N.Y.U. 
J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 587, 640 (2006) (describing the current environment with 
patent trolls as a potential crisis); Gregory Day, Competition and Piracy, 32 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 775, 786 (2017) (describing the economic atmosphere of stiff 
patent violation penalties which has created the patent troll industry). 
 289. See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 274, at 423 (finding that the costs from 
patent troll lawsuits are “substantial, and . . . correspond to substantial social 
costs as well”); see also Richard Posner, Patent Trolls, BECKNER-POSNER BLOG 
(July 21, 2013, 5:12 PM), http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2013/07/patent-
trollsposner.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2018) (“It is extremely difficult to discern 
any possible social benefit from trolls, and extremely easy to discern substantial 
social costs.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Maayan Perel, 
From Non-Practicing Entities (NPEs) to Non-Practiced Patents (NPPs): A 
Proposal for A Patent Working Requirement, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 747, 749 n.3 (2015) 
(“[A]nnual wealth lost from [non-practicing entity] lawsuits is around $80 billion 
for publicly traded U.S. firms and that much of this cost is a social loss not a mere 
transfer to [non-practicing entities].”); Fabio E. Marino & Teri H.P. Nguyen, Has 
Delaware Become the “New” Eastern District of Texas? The Unforeseen 
Consequences of the AIA, 30 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 527, 533 (2014) (“The 
social benefits [non-practicing entities] may offer, if any, are minimal and 
outweighed by the private and social costs they impose.”). But see Lauren Cohen 
et. al., “Troll” Check? A Proposal for Administrative Review of Patent Litigation, 
97 B.U. L. REV. 1775, 1807 (2017) (asserting that “the net social costs of [patent 
assertion entity—patent troll—]activity remain subject to heated debate”). 
 290. See Carhart v. Carhart-Halaska Int'l, LLC, 788 F.3d 687, 691 (7th Cir. 
2015) (“The commonest example of a law troll is the patent troll, who acquires by 
purchase or application to the Patent and Trademark Office a patent that he uses 
not to protect an invention but to obtain a license fee from, or legal judgment 
against, an alleged infringer.”). 
 291. See supra Part IV.C (discussing why specialized firms are less likely to 
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This constrains their sources of patent value to licensing or sale of 
the patent,292 which in turn expands the market for discount 
patents (and thus, furthers patent troll activity). Such a conclusion 
is made clear though a discussion of avenues available for software 
companies to monetize their AI patent holdings.  
In some instances, software companies might assign their 
patent to downstream AI users (e.g., firms licensing the use of the 
AI), and the patent is off the market.293 Likewise, software 
companies may sell licenses to use the patented technology and 
retain all substantial rights, including the right to sell the patent 
and sue for infringement.294 Neither of these situations create 
immediate worry. 
Patent troll concerns arise where a software company (that 
has been allocated relevant patent rights) issues a terminal 
number of licenses and is left holding a patent which it has no 
intention or capacity to exploit in commerce.295 The economically 
rational choice at that point is to sell the patent for any non-zero 
                                                                                                     
engage in commerce in the specific market where their technology will be used). 
 292. See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 228, at 2129–30 (describing the 
method employed by non-practicing entities to make a profit compared with the 
ability of practicing entities to cross-license their work to reduce costs). 
 293. See Michael Seringhaus, E-Book Transactions: Amazon “Kindles” the 
Copy Ownership Debate, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH. 147, 181–82 (2010) (discussing the 
classification of a downstream licensing agreement of a patented technology as 
an assignment of patent rights).  
 294. See Alfred E. Mann Found. for Sci. Research v. Cochlear Corp., 604 F.3d 
1354, 1359–60 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
Either the licensor did not transfer “all substantial rights” to the 
exclusive licensee, in which case the licensor remains the owner of the 
patent and retains the right to sue for infringement, or the licensor did 
transfer “all substantial rights” to the exclusive licensee, in which case 
the licensee becomes the owner of the patent for standing purposes and 
gains the right to sue on its own.  
See also Intellectual Prop. Dev., Inc. v. TCI Cablevision of Cal., Inc., 248 F.3d 
1333, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[A] nonexclusive license . . . confers no constitutional 
standing on the licensee under the Patent Act to bring suit or even to join a suit 
with the patentee because a nonexclusive (or ‘bare’) licensee suffers no legal injury 
from infringement.”). 
 295. See, e.g., Tim Carmody, When Startups Fail, Investors Recoup by Selling 
Patents, WIRED (Aug. 11, 2011, 12:02 PM), https://www.wired.com/ 
2011/08/startups-fail-sell-patents/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2018) (discussing the 
tendency of companies to sell patents when they can no longer profit by selling 
licenses) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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sum.296 This can positively reflect on the bottom line without 
inhibiting the rights of past licensees.297 This act, however, 
additionally benefits trolls looking to purchase inexpensive 
patents.298 
A sale of this nature will occur at a discounted rate because all 
prior licensing opportunities would rationally have been explored, 
along with any serious assignment opportunities.299 This situation 
plays into a common troll business tactic—purchasing discounted 
patents for subsequent litigation.300 Accordingly, assigning AI 
patent rights to software companies would further the patent troll 
business model. This creates new societal costs and deviates from 
the stated goal of economic efficiency (i.e., maximizing societal 
                                                                                                     
 296. See Stephen Bainbridge, Contractarianism in the Business Associations 
Classroom: Kovacik v. Reed and the Allocation of Capital Losses in Service 
Partnerships, 34 GA. L. REV. 631, 661 n.99 (2000) (summarizing the ultimatum 
game where the entity facing a potential loss should settle for any non-zero offer). 
 297. See TCI Cablevision of Cal., 248 F.3d at 1337 (determining that though 
one party granted a nonexclusive license to another party, the previous party 
maintained the ability to bring a suit). 
 298. Patent trolls commonly attempt to purchase their patents at discounted 
rates. See Ian Polonsky, You Can’t Go Home Again: The Righthaven Cases and 
Copyright Trolling on the Internet, 36 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 71, 72–73 (2012) (“The 
patent troll model works as follows: the troll seeks out opportunities to buy 
patents on the cheap, often during bankruptcy auctions or from producers hoping 
to sell under-utilized patents to fund other research projects.”); see also David B. 
Heedy, Has Alice Brought Us to Patent Wonderland?: Can the Supreme Court’s 
New Analysis of Abstract Ideas Affect the Current Problems Associated with 
Business-Method and Software Patents, 15 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 57, 62 (2016) 
(characterizing the patent troll business model as one of buying patents from 
firms who do not have enough capital to enforce patents themselves); 
Overstock.com, Inc. v. Furnace Brook, LLC, 420 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1218 (D. Utah 
2005) (patent troll “purchased its patent at a bankruptcy auction in 2003 and, 
without any apparent attempts to practice it, has since sent infringement letters” 
to numerous large companies), aff’d, 191 Fed. Appx. 959 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 299. See Erik Oliver et al., When Do Operating Companies Sell Their Patents, 
IPWATCHDOG (Aug. 16, 2016), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/08/16/operating-
companies-sell-their-patents/id=71890/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2018) (performing 
empirical analyses on the sale prices of patents to non-practicing entities to 
demonstrate that the likely cause of discounted patent sales is poor company 
health); see also supra notes 295–296 and accompanying text (discussing the 
economic pressure to sell for any non-zero sum when the company can no longer 
exploit the patent). 
 300. See supra note 298 and accompanying text (describing the need to 
purchase patents at discounted rates to fulfil the patent troll model). 
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surplus).301 Such an allocation of AI patent rights cannot, 
therefore, be a preferred policy. 
3. Costs Associated with Software Company Patentees 
Additional inefficiencies would arise from allocating AI patent 
rights to software companies. Coase Theorem—and the 
economically efficient state of affairs that it predicts—relies on the 
assumption of costless transactions and perfect information.302 
Part III.B described how to mimic costless transactions in reality, 
but had little need to substantively address the perfect information 
assumption. Real world deviation from this assumption would 
create substantial costs (and thus economic inefficiencies) if AI 
patent rights were allocated to software companies.303 
For software companies to successfully exploit AI patent 
rights allocated to them, they must be aware of, and capable of 
understanding, the means by which their software is being used by 
downstream AI users. While potentially able to monitor the 
operation and output of its AI, software companies are not 
guaranteed a technical understanding of that information. As 
discussed in the previous subsection, technical knowledge in the 
field of invention is not commonly held by software companies, and 
obtaining such expertise would come at the expense of hiring 
experts.304  
This want of relevant knowledge would create substantial 
costs for software companies in two distinct manners. Initially, the 
firms must maintain sufficient expertise to recognize what output 
(i.e., inventions) are worth the investment of patenting.305 It is a 
                                                                                                     
 301. See supra note 289 and accompanying text (identifying the social costs of 
patent trolls). 
 302. See Swygert & Yanes, supra note 186, at 270 (identifying the 
assumptions behind Coase Theorem, including “perfect knowledge” and “zero 
transaction costs”). 
 303. See supra notes 298–301 and accompanying text (discussing the 
significant social costs and inefficiencies associated with patent troll ownership 
of patents).  
 304. See supra Part IV.C (discussing why specialized firms are less likely to 
engage in commerce in the specific market where their technology will be used). 
 305. See Hansen et al., supra note 282, at 106–07 (discussing how firms 
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bad investment to patent all inventions produced by their AI 
(including bad ones), and it is likewise foolhardy to patent none of 
the inventions.306 The potential patentee must be able to 
distinguish the good from the bad.307 Software companies may 
secure technical expertise by making new hires or exchanging 
patent licenses for relevant knowhow.308 Regardless of the path 
chosen, however, the company is incurring additional expenses 
and deducting from economic efficiency.309 
A related cost comes from the expense of policing AI users.310 
Were software firms to be allocated the right to AI patents, they 
would need to be vigilant against attempts by users of their 
software to illicitly patent technologies in the users’ own name. 
Should an AI user create a particularly valuable invention, there 
are significant financial incentives to secure a patent with an 
employee of the firm incorrectly listed as the inventor. Absent 
recognition of the illicit activity and subsequent legal action, this 
would cut the software company out of income from the AI patent. 
To avoid such losses, significant policing measures would need 
be taken by the software firm. Initially, it would have to review 
patent filings by downstream users of its AI and compare them to 
                                                                                                     
maintain organizational knowledge relevant to their field of expertise). 
 306. See, e.g., Stephen Key, Software Startups: This Is How You Craft a Patent 
Strategy, FORBES (June 27, 2018, 5:12 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/stephenkey/2018/06/27/software-startups-this-is-
how-you-craft-a-patent-strategy/#21973d591fee (last visited Dec. 4, 2018) 
(discussing the general drawbacks of patenting software in certain circumstances 
and not patenting in others) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 307. See Verweij, supra note 283, at 1048 (“Firms have detailed knowledge of 
their cost structure, and they are well positioned to develop new technologies and 
to find efficient, practical solutions to [their] problems.” (alteration in original)). 
 308. See supra notes 231–235 and accompanying text (demonstrating that the 
parties not participating in the actual manufacturing process are more likely to 
not engage directly in the relevant market). 
 309. See discussion supra Part IV.B (discussing the tendency for parties 
participating in the market to value the patents most). 
 310. See Edward Brunet & David J. Sweeney, Integrating Antitrust Procedure 
and Substance After Northwest Wholesale Stationers: Evolving Antitrust 
Approaches to Pleadings, Burden of Proof, and Boycotts, 72 VA. L. REV. 1015, 1028 
(1986) (discussing the costs of policing contract compliance); see also Note, CBS v. 
ASCAP: Performing Rights Societies and the Per Se Rule, 87 YALE L.J. 783, 786 
(1978) (describing the enormity of the costs associated with policing the 
contracts). 
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the invention output of its software. To effectively do so, the 
software company must expend resources on technical experts and 
patent lawyers to determine whether others are illicitly patenting 
inventions arising from its AI. Beyond the mere cost of such 
policing, this type of activity is likely to further decrease economic 
efficiency through legal expenses and soured business 
relationships should misdeeds be identified. This host of additional 
costs detract from economic efficiency, and again, disfavors 
allocation of AI patent rights to software companies.  
E. Future Research 
This Article presents the first significant analysis of the 
allocation of patent rights arising from AI invention. There are, not 
surprisingly, a variety of other issues in this nascent field that 
warrant future research. This subpart briefly recognizes several of 
these issues. 
A majority of the literature and commentary believes that AI 
patents will eventually be issued,311 and indeed, this Article 
proceeds under that expectation. There are, however, a variety of 
policy issues underlying this determination that should be fully 
vetted in the literature. Initially, refusing to issue AI patents 
creates several incentives that cut against public policy. A primary 
goal of the patent system is dissemination of technological 
advances.312 Refusing to issue AI patents, however, encourages 
inventing software users to maintain their inventions as a trade 
secret (if possible) because public disclosure makes the technology 
available to competitors with no benefit to the inventor beyond a 
head start in the marketplace.313 Such a policy likewise incents 
                                                                                                     
 311. See, e.g., Hattenbach & Glucoft, supra note 12, at 51 (citing the 
adherence to the “Constitutional objective of advancing the progress of useful 
arts” as the reason for future allowance of AI patents); Abbott, supra note 9, at 
1081–82. (arguing that AI ownership should not be prevented by the history of 
the “Copyright Office’s Human Authorship Requirement”). This belief is not, 
however, universally held. See Ravid & Xiaoqiong, supra note 121, at 2222 
(arguing for the abolishment of patent protections for AI created inventions). 
 312. See Miller, supra note 115, at 1067 (citing the goal of copyright is 
progress). 
 313. See Symposium, A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of 
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deceit in naming a human as inventor where a technology was 
actually created by AI. This type of duplicitousness could 
successfully circumvent a ban on AI patents, as the Patent Office 
will not investigate or reject applications for failures to correctly 
name an inventor.314 Patents issued under such subterfuge are 
subject to invalidation,315 but the owner will enjoy the same 
benefits as a legitimate patentee until their patent is invalidated 
(if caught).316  
A contrary policy argument recognizes that AI invention is 
relatively low in cost, and thus, does not need the incentive of a 
patent to be undertaken. It could likewise be argued that such 
low-cost invention and patenting creates social costs in the form of 
patent thickets.317 Future research is warranted to address these 
arguments. 
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Moving from patent prosecution and ownership, there are 
future issues to be addressed with regard to patent infringement 
by AI. For example, assume AI is developed by Company I, licensed 
to Company II, and then integrated into a product used by 
Company III.318 If the AI independently begins to operate the 
product in a manner that infringes on existing patents, which 
party is liable (ignoring contractual issues)? Even if no party was 
aware of the AI’s “decision” to operate the product in an infringing 
manner, liability will arise because “patent infringement is a strict 
liability offense.”319 While liability seems appropriate for the 
product’s owner (Company III), there are interesting questions of 
induced infringement by the others.320 If it was foreseeable that 
the AI would begin to behave in an infringing manner, liability 
might be found.321 These questions must be vetted in the literature 
and courts as the field of AI and invention progress. 
V. Conclusion 
Invention via AI is the future of innovation. Unfortunately, at 
this time, the United States patent regime has yet to address the 
issue of how, and whether, it will issue AI patents. This Article 
attempts to make progress on this issue by presenting the first 
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substantial consideration on AI patent allocation and societal 
efficiency. Such information is of primary importance in the choice 
of to whom to grant AI patents. With this in mind, the Article 
concludes that, via a Coasean analysis, the rights to AI patent 
should be allocated to AI users (i.e., parties using AI to create new 
technologies) to maximize economic efficiency. 
